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Illness is the night-side of life, a more onerous citizenship.  Everyone 
who is born holds dual citizenship, in the kingdom of the well and in the 
kingdom of the sick. 
Susan Sontag
1
 
INTRODUCTION 
Sometimes what is implied and inferred can be as important as 
what is stated.  In this Article, I argue that the political debate that 
preceded the enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (PPACA),2 as well as the legal debate that now swirls around 
the question of its constitutionality, mask a foundational question 
about national identity.  PPACA, of course, does not literally consti-
tute or reconstitute citizenship (although it does require legal resi-
dence as the price of admission).3  But it creates the potential for 
broad public conversation—as has never before occurred in the Unit-
ed States—regarding the question of what the relationship should be 
between membership in the American community and meaningful 
access to health care. 
At face value, PPACA primarily seeks to make the individual and 
small-group health insurance markets rational and workable, to fill 
the enormous gap that has existed in coverage, and to create insur-
ance exchanges to regulate quality and police access.4  Upon full im-
plementation, it will achieve nearly universal, but also probably quite 
uneven, coverage and will perpetuate a deeply fragmented model of 
social insurance.  If one imagines the health care system as a political 
domain, with the various institutions and subsystems as components, 
PPACA is less like our Constitution and more like a reinvention of the 
Articles of Confederation.  Under PPACA, health insurance in the 
United States will remain a federated collection of risk pools, located 
in workplaces, public systems, and the new exchanges. 
 
1 SUSAN SONTAG, ILLNESS AS METAPHOR 3 (1978). 
2 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
3 See PPACA § 1312(f)(3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18032(f)(3) (West Supp. 1B 2010) (not-
ing that qualified individuals, for the purposes of the Act, are only those who are citi-
zens or aliens lawfully present). 
4 I do not mean to diminish the importance of PPACA’s expansions of Medicare 
and especially Medicaid.  I do not discuss them in this article because they are exten-
sions of existing programs, and I focus here on PPACA’s role in the creation of new 
institutions and norms. 
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Nonetheless, the debate that has accompanied PPACA’s adoption 
is about something bigger than spending curves, comparative effec-
tiveness, or even medical-loss ratios (not that any of those should be 
considered trivial).  The deep structure of this hyper-technical statute 
gestures to the existence of a health care universe that, in Haberma-
sian terms, could be its own lifeworld.5  For persons with chronic dis-
eases, the health care system truly becomes a world unto itself.  For 
others, it may be more like a foreign country visited for an intense but 
brief period of time, or perhaps one to which we pay little attention.6  
Although the internal operations of the health care universe are sel-
dom thought of as political, its power is such that, upon entry, it may 
bring us life or death, profit or poverty, autonomy or dependency. 
In the interface between the health care system and the legal sys-
tem, multiple legal paradigms are in play.  For questions of access to 
care through insurance, a mixture of contract and social welfare 
principles dominate, implicating norms of social solidarity as well as 
the exchange of defined promises and entitlements.  As Lawrence 
Mead has noted, social welfare programs that incorporate both bene-
fits and reciprocal obligations provide individuals with an “opera-
tional definition of citizenship.”7 
PPACA creates a new social welfare and insurance program that 
redesigns access to health care.  Its precise impact on the social mean-
ings associated with individual health and the health of the nation is 
difficult to predict, but it almost certainly will be powerful.  A dis-
course on belonging, rights and obligations—a discourse on citizen-
ship—is likely to evolve as the effects of the reform take hold.  If that 
occurs, the question will not be whether PPACA will provide some op-
erational definition of what we understand to be the scope of social 
citizenship, but how it does so; not if there will be some ethic of rights 
and obligations that will develop around the new law, but what the 
content of that ethic will be.  As in real, rather than metaphorical, citi-
zenship, belonging in the reformed health care system will be defined 
in part by those who are not permitted to belong, and rights will be 
defined in part by their circumscription.  The determination of the 
 
5 Habermas used the term “lifeworld” to describe major domains of social and in-
dividual life, such as the market or the family.  See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS 
AND NORMS:  CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 
353-54 (William Rehg trans., 1996). 
6 Thanks to Bill Sage for suggesting these analogies. 
7 LAWRENCE M. MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT:  THE SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS OF CITI-
ZENSHIP 249 (1986) (emphasis omitted). 
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validity of the individual mandate, which is occurring in the current 
litigation challenging the constitutionality of PPACA,8 will profoundly 
shape the nature of its ethic of obligation. 
The debates about PPACA illustrate that constitutional concepts 
are intertwined with narrative understandings of government authori-
ty and individual rights and duties.  The trope of the “living Constitu-
tion,” for example, began with Franklin Roosevelt, who asserted that 
we have a “living Constitution” as part of his argument that the Depr-
ession necessitated a more capacious scope for executive branch auth-
ority.9  More recently, the phrase has figured prominently in debates 
over originalism and has been invoked as an interpretive premise for 
justifying heightened judicial review of laws curbing individual rights.10  
PPACA may usher in yet another dimension of a “living Constitution”:  
not as a more expansive understanding of government power or of 
individual rights, but of our shared obligations to one another. 
This Article anticipates how the new health governance structures 
that PPACA creates may reshape the social meanings, in addition to 
the finances and mechanics, of the American health system.  I develop 
a concept of “citizenship practices” to describe the components asso-
ciated with the relationship between the individual and the collective.  
I argue for using citizenship practices as a substitute for the overused 
metaphor of citizenship and as a way of capturing the dynamic of be-
longing, rights, and obligations.  This dynamic exists in multiple social 
and political locations beyond the terms of the legal status of an indi-
vidual with a particular sovereign state, and thus the frame of citizen-
 
8 See infra note 98 and accompanying text. 
9 See JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER 304, 458-59 (2010) (arguing that President 
Roosevelt strongly believed that the Justices’ belief in a “living Constitution” was neces-
sary for his ambitious social programs to survive). 
10 The phrase “living Constitution” has been used with distaste by some—and ad-
miration by others—to describe rights-enhancing models of constitutional interpreta-
tion. Compare Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 
IND. L.J. 1, 1 (1971) (calling “deplorable” the fact that “the nature of the Constitution 
will change, often quite dramatically, as the personnel of the Supreme Court 
changes”), and William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. 
REV. 693, 706 (1976) (describing a view of a “living Constitution” that would allow “ap-
pointed federal judges to impose . . . a rule of conduct that the popular elected 
branches of governance would not have enacted” as “genuinely corrosive of the funda-
mental values of our democratic society”), with Adam Winkler, A Revolution Too Soon:  
Woman Suffragists and the “Living Constitution,” 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1456, 1523 (2001) (not-
ing that woman suffragists advanced the concept of a living Constitution by looking be-
hind the text and amplifying principles embedded within the document as “restorative of 
the commitments of American democracy and mandated by the demands of reason”). 
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ship practices offers a better conceptual tool for understanding the 
social meaning of new patterns of behavior and belief. 
In analyzing citizenship practices related to PPACA, I address how 
the process by which PPACA creates new institutions will shape the ac-
tions of individuals interacting with the health system, including their 
participation in various, usually localized institutions of governance. 
These new regularized practices have the potential to lead to new dis-
courses and understandings about the interrelationship between indi-
vidualism and collectivity, and about the public and private dimensions 
of the health system.  The concept of citizenship practices is intended 
to capture both the new activities and the new consciousness. 
Of greatest importance to this emerging discourse is the individu-
al mandate portion of PPACA.11  Under the Act’s “minimum essential 
coverage” provision, all but a small number of Americans must either 
purchase health insurance or pay a penalty.12  The individual mandate 
requires most U.S. residents to obtain health insurance for themselves 
and their dependents no later than 2014; those who do not comply will 
be subject to a tax penalty.13  Enrollment in most private sector health 
plans will satisfy the mandate; acceptable plans include employer-
sponsored policies,14 policies sold on the individual market, existing 
 
11 PPACA § 1501(b), 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West Supp. 1A 2010).   
12 Id.  The mandate applies to residents lawfully in the United States, except those 
who are incarcerated, who file a religious conscience objection, or who participate in a 
preexisting health care sharing ministry.  Id., 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(d).  In addition, des-
ignated exemptions are made for American Indians, individuals lacking insurance for 
three months or less, or those eligible for a “hardship exemption” based on low income.  
Id., 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(e).  Individuals eligible for a hardship exemption include those 
for whom the cost of the lowest available plan after applicable subsidies are applied ex-
ceeds eight percent of income, those with income less than the federal income tax filing 
threshold, or those otherwise defined by the Secretary to have “suffered a hardship with 
respect to the capability to obtain coverage under a qualified health plan.”  Id. 
13 Id. 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(b).  The tax penalty will be the greater of a flat tax 
(starting at $95 in 2014, increasing to $695 by 2016, and thereafter subject to 
cost-of-living adjustments) or an income-based tax (starting at 1% of income in 2014, 
increasing to 2.5% by 2016).  Id. § 10106(b)(1), 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(c)(2)(B);   
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 § 1002, 26 U.S.C.A. 
§ 5000A(c)(3)(d).  A reduced (one-half) penalty will apply for failure to insure child-
ren.  PPACA § 1501(b), 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(c)(3)(C).  By 2016, penalties will be 
capped at the greater of 2.5% of income or three times the individual penalty, and may 
not exceed the national average premium cost of the least expensive plan sold on the 
applicable exchange.  Id. § 10106(b)(1), 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(c)(2)(B). 
14 PPACA’s “pay or play” provision creates a mandate for large employers, requir-
ing them to either offer employees a minimum coverage option (play), cover the cost 
sharing subsidy, or provide a tax credit for employees to purchase coverage on an ex-
change (pay).  Id. § 1513(a), 26 U.S.C.A. § 4980H. 
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health plans grandfathered into the new regulations, or any other plan 
or policy providing “minimum essential coverage” as defined by the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services.15  Those who enroll in public 
plans such as Medicaid or Medicare will also be in compliance.16 
Part I of this article provides a framework for analyzing the rela-
tionships between citizenship concepts and social insurance systems 
such as PPACA.  I describe the inexactitude of both theory and law as 
to the obligations of citizenship in the United States and discuss the 
ways in which a tradition of consumer citizens has filled in some of the 
gaps in the social meaning of citizenship.  I also examine the role of so-
cial insurance programs, specifically assessing the Social Security system 
to demonstrate how a concrete model of social citizenship can develop. 
Part II turns to the specific example of PPACA and examines both 
the structural and symbolic roles played by the individual mandate.  I 
argue that the current litigation over the constitutionality of PPACA 
has generated a contest of signification between the competing values 
associated with economic liberty and the social compact.  Thus, while 
the Supreme Court will decide whether the individual mandate is va-
lid based on its interpretation of congressional power under Article I, 
the popular understanding of this debate is much more grounded in a 
contest of meaning over how much the individual can be forced to 
participate in a social insurance system. 
Part III elaborates on the concept of citizenship practices and its 
usefulness in analyzing structures for participation in American socie-
ty.  I explain the concept of citizenship practices as referring to regu-
larized behaviors and interactions with a system of governance and a 
coherent (although not necessarily universal) set of beliefs about the 
meaning of those behaviors.  I then examine specific and concrete go-
vernance issues that must be addressed in the implementation phases 
of PPACA and argue that the resolution of those questions could en-
hance or inhibit an understanding of PPACA as a new form of social 
citizenship in the United States. 
I.  SOCIAL INSURANCE AND THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF CITIZENSHIP 
Social insurance programs operate, in many ways, as instruments 
of governance.  They channel, incentivize, and penalize behaviors; es-
tablish systems of rights and requirements; distribute risks and provide 
a promise of collective security against shared risk; and define mem-
 
15 Id. § 1501(b), 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(f). 
16 Id. 
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bership in a collective undertaking.17  In social insurance, as in struc-
tures of government, a tension exists between the goals of collective 
good and of individual freedom.  The identification and pricing of 
risk, financed and subsidized by public funds, effectively implements 
redistributive policy decisions.  Even private insurance performs criti-
cal social functions:  Tom Baker has described insurance law prin-
ciples as a “guide to the social compact,”18 and Jeffrey Stempel argues 
that insurance policies function as “social institutions or social instru-
ments . . . often acting as adjunct arms of governance”19 and as “part of 
the social policy infrastructure.”20 
Pooling risk as a method of achieving security characterizes both 
social insurance programs and private insurance policies.  It is only in 
the former, however, that the shared understandings of such systems 
create a sense of social solidarity.  Social insurance exists in an episte-
mological space where notions of common good intersect with beliefs 
about individual obligation.  As a result, social insurance aligns with 
the conceptual trilogy of belonging, rights, and duties that is essential 
to any meaning of citizenship.21 
This Part examines how the concepts and functioning of social in-
surance systems relate to understandings of citizenship.  The domi-
nant theme in citizenship theory has been an articulation of rights.  
My focus is different:  I look more deeply into the duties associated with 
the citizen role and into the question of how program-design structure 
can shape individual participation in governance activities.  I analyze 
how these components of citizenship as a social role—rather than of ci-
tizenship as a formal legal status—operate in social insurance systems. 
In doing so, I apply insights from non-legal scholarship about the 
interrelationship of economic-political notions of citizenship and the 
socio-political role of consumers.  What political scientists have la-
beled as a right of participation in the private sector has historically 
taken the form of consumer movements or, when limited to the 
 
17 See generally RICHARD V. ERICSON ET AL., INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE 35-46 
(2003) (describing the collective sharing of risk as “the hallmark of citizenship in 
strong social democracies”). 
18 Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 291 (1996). 
19 Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument and Social Institution, 
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489, 1495 (2010). 
20 Id. at 1511. 
21 See infra notes 22-47 and accompanying text.  I borrow the term “belonging” 
from Kenneth Karst and intend it to encompass norms of participation and social soli-
darity.  See generally KENNETH KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA:  EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND 
THE CONSTITUTION (1989). 
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workplace, of organized labor.  I analyze how PPACA offers the poten-
tial for testing whether individuals will act as “consumer citizens” in 
the new health insurance system. 
Finally, to establish a rough set of benchmarks for assessing the 
likely impact of PPACA on understandings of citizenship, I conclude 
this Part with a discussion of Social Security. 
A.  The Obligations of Citizenship 
Citizenship-related scholarship has blossomed into an academic 
cottage industry in recent years,22 but the literature has incorporated 
health care only minimally into the various categories and functions 
described by the leading theorists.  Modern citizenship theory began 
with the work of T. H. Marshall, who, writing in the late 1940s against 
the background of a new British national health system, classified 
health care as a social right rather than a political or civil right.23  Mar-
shall treated health care as he did education, arguing that both were 
essential to dignitary rights and “equality of status.”24 
Marshall’s tripartite typology, with its social justice orientation and 
focus on the relationship between citizenship and social inequality, 
addressed only the nature of the rights that comprise citizenship.25  
Two moves by later scholars of citizenship theory are particularly rele-
vant to the project of understanding how American social insurance 
programs—including PPACA’s new model—can be analyzed in terms 
of citizenship.  First is the work of scholars who have attempted to re-
cuperate the centrality of obligations as part of the social meaning of 
citizenship.  Second is the addition of an independent right of partic-
ipation to Marshall’s model. 
 
22 See MARGARET R. SOMERS, GENEALOGIES OF CITIZENSHIP 12-14 (2008) (“Since 
being awakened from a long dormancy at the end of the twentieth century, studies of 
citizenship have been making up for lost time at a breathtaking pace.”).  For recent 
additions to the growing field of citizen-related scholarship see, for example, LINDA 
BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN (2008); THOMAS JANOSKI, CITIZENSHIP AND 
CIVIL SOCIETY (1998). 
23 See T.H. MARSHALL, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS 54 (1950) (describing health 
care as a means of increasing general social welfare and providing social rights). 
24 Id. at 56 (arguing that provision of social services is not designed to equalize in-
comes, but rather to equalize status via “class fusion” when all members of society share 
a “common experience”). 
25 Marshall only briefly discussed concomitant obligations of citizenship.  See id. at 
60-62 (giving examples of subordination of individual rights to collective need in hous-
ing and education). 
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The dominant American tradition of liberal rights has long ex-
isted in a dialectical relationship with a tradition of communitarian 
relationships and obligations.26  The concept of citizenship as a reci-
procal relationship dates from the liberal tradition that fueled the 
American Revolution.27  In the same vein, Kenneth Karst’s work on the 
equal-dignity understanding of citizenship presupposes “two related 
and overlapping values:  participation and responsibility . . . . To be a 
citizen is not merely to be a consumer of rights, but to be responsible 
to other members of the community.”28  Despite the conventional 
pairing of rights and duties, there has been significantly less elabora-
tion of the responsibility branch than of the rights branch, either in 
political theory29 or in constitutional law or scholarship.  A robust de-
bate about obligations of citizenship has emerged, however, in the le-
gal challenges to PPACA. 
The law on citizen duties that does exist is structured in concen-
tric circles, moving outward from those obligations linked to constitu-
tional text to those that are at most implicit.  Beginning at the core, 
the Supreme Court has upheld congressional authority under Article I’s 
enumerated powers to compel citizens to render military service30 and 
to file income tax returns and pay the appropriate taxes.31 
 
26 See, e.g., MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT:  AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A 
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 201-49 (1996) (discussing the tension between the voluntarist 
conception of freedom and political control). 
27 See LINDA K. KERBER, NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES:  WOMEN AND 
THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 8-9 (1998) (describing various schools of thought 
during the Revolutionary period grounded in the belief that individuals assumed obli-
gations to the state when accepting citizenship and that the state assumed reciprocal 
obligations); Linda K. Kerber, The Meanings of Citizenship, 84 J. AM. HIST. 833, 833-36 
(1997) (asserting that the founding generation “constructed a new and reciprocal rela-
tionship between state and citizen”). 
28 Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword:  Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1977). 
29 See JANOSKI, supra note 22, at 53 (stating that “citizenship theories . . . have 
tended to ignore duties and obligations”); id. at 219 (describing obligations as the 
“theoretical stepchild” of citizenship theory).  Although Janoski criticized the tendency 
of theorists to overlook the obligations aspect of citizenship, his own taxonomy of citi-
zens’ obligations is fairly shallow, concentrating on the individual’s duty to provide fi-
nancial support (presumably by paying taxes).  Id. at 53-56. 
30 See, e.g., Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 387-88 (1918) (stating that at-
tacks on the constitutionality of a selective draft law were flawed, as compulsory service 
is sanctioned by the text of the Constitution and grounded in historical practice). 
31 See, e.g., Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1916) (finding that the 
Sixteenth Amendment’s income tax provisions are compatible with the unquestioned 
constitutional authority to levy income taxes). 
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The second concentric circle of citizenship duties includes those 
that one can reasonably infer from constitutional text.  For example, 
the Supreme Court has ruled that enacting a statute that requires in-
dividuals to appear and testify in court upon service of a subpoena 
falls within Congress’s powers.32  Even for this noncontroversial propo-
sition, the Court sought constitutional authority from multiple 
sources:  historical tradition dating to Elizabethan England, refer-
ences in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the rights of the accused 
to certain incidents of trial, and historical understandings of the indi-
vidual’s duty toward the common good.33  Similarly, repeated refer-
ences in the Constitution to juries34 implicitly support the conclusion 
that requiring jury service is a concomitant necessary and proper ex-
ercise of Congressional power, even without the explicit constitutional 
mention of such service. 
The third and outermost circle of citizenship duties encompasses 
the broad discretion recognized under the state police powers doc-
trine.35  Where a state’s police powers are implicated, the Court has 
invoked communitarian reasoning and rejected claims that an indi-
vidual’s constitutionally protected liberty was violated.  For example, 
in Butler v. Perry, the Court relied on “ancient usage and the unanimity 
of judicial opinion” to reject a Thirteenth Amendment challenge to a 
state law requiring every able-bodied adult male to contribute physical 
 
32 See, e.g., Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281-82 (1919) (finding that person-
al obligations must be put aside at times in order to perform one’s public duties, such 
as responding to a subpoena). 
33 See Blair, 250 U.S. at 281.  On the final point, the Court elaborated that 
the giving of testimony and the attendance upon court or grand jury in order 
to testify are public duties which every person within the jurisdiction of the 
Government is bound to perform upon being properly summoned . . . . The 
personal sacrifice involved is a part of the necessary contribution of the indi-
vidual to the welfare of the public. 
Id. 
34 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury . . . .”); 
id. amend. VI (granting the accused the right to a trial “by an impartial jury”); id. 
amend. VII (granting the right to a jury trial at common law). 
35 For example, in the mid-nineteenth century, the Wisconsin Supreme Court de-
clared, 
There are very many instances in which the citizen is required to perform per-
sonal service, or render aid to his government, without other compensation 
than that of his participation in the general good, and his enjoyment of the 
general security and advantage which result from common acquiescence in 
such obligations on the part of all the citizens alike, and which is essential to 
the existence and safety of society. 
West v. State, 1 Wis. 209, 234 (1853). 
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labor to the maintenance of public roads.36  Citing Blackstone’s Com-
mentaries, which in turn cites Roman law, the Court justified the affir-
mative duty as a contemporary extrapolation from the first of the tri-
noda necessitas, namely, repair of bridges, construction of fortifications, 
and service in the militia.37  Because each community was understood 
to have a duty to keep thoroughfares within its boundaries in good 
repair, the obligation of each member of the community to provide 
labor without compensation to maintain roads was “part of the duty 
which he owes to the public.”38 
A strand of case law regarding citizenship-linked duties also exists 
in public-schooling cases.  Courts have upheld truancy laws that pun-
ished parents who did not send their children to school on the under-
standing that public schools were “not so much a right granted to the 
pupils as a duty imposed upon them for the public good”39 and a 
“guard against the dangers of ‘incompetent citizenship.’”40  The con-
cept of education as an appropriate—and indeed enforceable—
obligation of citizenship has endured.41 
Beyond this handful of loosely related examples, however, there is 
considerable muddiness about precisely which obligations are under-
stood to constitute duties of citizenship or what unifying rationale 
they share.  The parties challenging the constitutionality of PPACA 
have used this lack of clarity to argue for the narrowest understanding 
of citizenship norms.  The word “draft” recurs in the debates over the 
individual mandate,42 for example, and is used to delineate the sharp 
contrast that conservatives see between PPACA’s individual mandate 
 
36 240 U.S. 328, 330 (1916). 
37 Id. at 330-31 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *357) 
38 Id. at 330. 
39 Fogg v. Bd. of Educ., 82 A. 173, 175 (N.H. 1912). 
40 Id.; see also State v. Hoyt, 146 A. 170, 171 (N.H. 1929) (relying on Fogg for the 
proposition that requiring children to attend school betters society as a whole). 
41 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (referring to education as 
a “general obligation of citizenship”); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 297 (N.J. 
1973) (finding that a system of school financing leading to disparate funding across 
schools violated the state’s obligation to provide an adequate public school system). 
42 For example, the Virginia Attorney General Kenneth Cuccinelli, a plaintiff in 
one of the challenges, argued, “This lawsuit is not about health care, it’s about our 
freedom . . . . The government cannot draft an unwilling citizen into commerce just 
so it can regulate him under the Commerce Clause.”  David M. Drucker, Virginia 
Judge Allows Health Care Challenge to Proceed, ROLL CALL (Aug. 2, 2010, 1:40 PM), 
http://www.rollcall.com/news/48911-1.html; see also Matt Sissel, Health-Care Reform:  
Why I’m Suing to Get Back My Freedom, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 13, 2010, avail-
able at 2010 WLNR 18185542 (“I object to being conscripted into a federal health-
care program . . . .”). 
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and those demands, such as Selective Service, that they do consider to 
be indisputable obligations of citizenship.  As the Cato Institute ar-
gued in its amicus brief in the Virginia case, “To be sure, there are ex-
ceptional situations in which the federal government may mandate 
individual activity . . . [for example, the draft, jury duty, and payment 
of income tax].  But these duties go to the heart of American citizen-
ship.”43  Similarly, three former Attorneys General of the United States 
argued in the same case that “the broad police power of the States 
did . . . include some authority to require affirmative action—but the 
duty was of the citizen to the state and was rooted in tradition.”44  In 
both instances, the authors of the briefs apparently believed that to 
state the distinction between the duties of citizenship and the obliga-
tion to join a national social insurance system was to prove it. 
Whether access to health care (via health insurance) is a right has 
long been the master frame of social justice debates in the realm of 
health.  I would have predicted that the national debates following 
enactment of a broad health reform law would have focused on the 
extent of newly created rights.  What is remarkable about the dis-
course that has emerged from the constitutional challenges to PPACA 
so far is the extent to which its master frame is over the proper scope 
of the individual’s obligations. 
B.  Participation Rights and Citizen Consumers 
Traditional approaches to citizenship, such as Marshall’s, have 
engaged only questions of the individual’s relationship to the state.  
The perspective of citizenship as a social role, however, opens up a 
broader view that can take a more functional approach to citizenship 
practices.  One such function centers on participation, an element not 
necessarily limited to the state or to purely public institutions. 
Thomas Janoski has argued that participation rights form a fourth 
category, in addition to Marshall’s typology, of the incidents of citi-
zenship.45  Janoski defines participation rights as “individual and 
 
43 Memorandum of the Cato Inst. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff’s Op-
position to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 13, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 
728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010)(No. 10-0188) [hereinafter Memorandum of the 
Cato Inst. et al.]. 
44 Memorandum of Amici Curiae, Former United States Attorneys General Wil-
liam Barr, et al., in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 17-18, Cucc-
inelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (No. 10-0188). 
45 See JANOSKI, supra note 22, at 28-33 (arguing that most theorists have failed to 
recognize participation rights).  
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group rights to participate in private decision making through some 
measure of control over markets, organizations, and capital,” with 
most of his examples focused on workers and unions.46 
PPACA creates new opportunities for effectuation of a participa-
tion right outside government, not in the employment context but in 
the potential for the role of consumer to overlap with that of citizen.  
The border between being a citizen and being a consumer is especially 
porous in the health care system.47  A deep public-private dual identity 
permeates PPACA’s structure, just as it has long been pervasive in the 
health care system; the individual mandate’s command to purchase in-
surance products on the private market is one of countless examples of 
its manifestation.  A correlative right of participation should be viewed 
as reciprocal to the individual’s obligation to purchase insurance. 
New scholarship, primarily in history, has sought to recuperate the 
idea that consumer experiences can enhance the potential for greater 
involvement in political activities and for strengthening of democratic 
values.  The work of Lizabeth Cohen especially suggests that “citizen” 
and “consumer” are not necessarily an antithetical, dichotomous, or 
mutually exclusive pairing in American politics.48  Cohen’s work has 
excavated a progressive “consumer citizen” identity that flowered dur-
ing the New Deal.49 
Government officials during the Roosevelt administration sought 
both to strengthen and to draw strength from national consumer or-
ganizations, declaring that a governance role for consumers would 
“put the market power of the consumer to work politically.”50  Presi-
dential speeches validated the right of consumers “to have their inter-
 
46 Id. at 32. 
47 Cf. Nan D. Hunter, Rights Talk and Patient Subjectivity:  The Role of Autonomy, 
Equality, and Participation Norms, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1525, 1545-47 (2010) 
(“[T]he American health care system is being actively reshaped by the expectations of 
consumers and consumer-centric financial incentives.” (citations and internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). 
48 See LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMERS’ REPUBLIC:  THE POLITICS OF MASS CON-
SUMPTION IN POSTWAR AMERICA 8 (2003) (“[C]itizen and consumer were ever-shifting 
categories that sometimes overlapped, often were in tension, but always reflected the 
permeability of the political and economic spheres.”); see also T.H. BREEN, THE MAR-
KETPLACE OF REVOLUTION:  HOW CONSUMER POLITICS SHAPED AMERICAN INDEPEN-
DENCE, at XV-XVII (2004) (arguing that the consumer experiences of colonists helped 
facilitate mobilization for the American Revolution). 
49 See COHEN, supra note 48, at 23-37, 66-112 (describing the New Deal’s “growing 
attentiveness to consumers as a way of . . . protecting . . . the public interest”). 
50 Id. at 8. 
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ests represented in the formulation of government policy.”51  Formal 
bodies for direct consumer representation were established within the 
National Recovery Administration (NRA), the Office of Price Admin-
istration (OPA) (during World War II), the Tennessee Valley Authori-
ty, and the Rural Electrification Administration.52  Both the NRA and 
the OPA set up state and local consumer advisory groups as well.53  
This focus on active participation built on and expanded the notion 
of consumer politics developed during the Progressive Era, when re-
forms were enacted to protect purchasers from tainted products, but 
consumer representatives did not join decisionmaking bodies.54 
Cohen argues that the consumer-citizen framework emerged dur-
ing the 1930s as a politically “acceptable way of promoting the public 
good” without invoking overtly socialist rhetoric, and as a tactic for 
melding democratic values with the preservation of capitalism.55  Both 
of these objectives resonate with the political history of PPACA as well.  
What Tom Baker describes elsewhere in this volume as the trade-off in 
PPACA between social solidarity and the insurance law precept of fair 
(i.e., actuarially justified) discrimination56 speaks to the same per-
ceived political need to balance themes of collective responsibility 
with those of individualism that Cohen discerned in the New Deal. 
A note of caution is in order.  I do not mean to overstate the pro-
gressive potential for consumer citizen politics.  Access to health care 
in the United States has long turned on a bargained-for form of “be-
longing” to what is typically a private market risk pool without any 
meaningful accompanying rights.57  On this view, the political rela-
 
51 Id. at 30 (internal citations omitted). 
52 Id. at 28-31, 66-67. 
53 Id. at 66-67. 
54 See id. at 21-23 (describing the efforts to organize consumer advocacy groups 
and to pass legislation in the early 1900s). 
55 Id. at 23. 
56 Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577, 1602 (2011) (“[T]he [PPACA] extends the 
fair share approach to health care financing by bringing more people under the 
health insurance umbrella.  At the same time, the Act extends the nondiscrimination 
vision of what constitutes a fair share from the large-group market into the individual 
and small-group market.”). 
57 Since 1974, the Employee Retirement Insurance Security Act (ERISA), 29 
U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2006), has dominated regulation of the biggest chunk of the 
health insurance market employer-sponsored plans.  ERISA does not require employ-
ers to offer health benefits, nor does it offer any correlative right of employees to gain 
access to coverage.  Generally, the terms of ERISA have been interpreted to limit liabil-
ity to plans should employers breach contracts with their employee enrollees. See, e.g., 
Katherine L. Record, Note, Wielding the Wand Without Facing the Music:  Allowing Utiliza-
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tionship of individuals to the American health care system illustrates 
what Margaret Somers has described as only a thin form of “contract-
ualized” citizenship.58  This kind of link between citizenship and con-
sumer activities points to an understanding of governance as stake-
holder pluralism, rather than as a reinforcement of social solidarity 
norms.  Consistent with that concern, the normative values associated 
with a contract-based understanding of citizenship in the health care 
system speak less to social solidarity than to the individual’s capacity to 
identify and purchase coverage that will most closely match her cost 
and quality preferences.59 
However, it would also be a mistake to dismiss entirely the poten-
tial for mobilization that attends participation in market-oriented activi-
ties and practices. The experience of consumer citizenship in the 1930s 
succeeded in two key respects important for a project linked to progres-
sive values:  democratic norms and practices reached federal, state, and 
local levels of governance, and the resulting institutions went beyond 
representation of consumer interests to the establishment of systems for 
consumer participation in policymaking.  Cohen’s work demonstrates 
that the participatory mechanisms for consumers during the New Deal 
did not exist simply as rote formalities, but that citizen consumers were 
genuinely engaged in that effort as well.60  This history of broadly dif-
fused engagement suggests that social insurance programs, including 
PPACA, could produce effective venues for citizenship practices. 
 
tion Review Physicians to Trump Doctors’ Orders, but Protecting Them from the Legal Risk Ordi-
narily Attached to the Medical Degree, 59 DUKE L.J. 955, 967 (2010) (noting that ERISA al-
lows recovery of benefits denied but not compensatory or punitive damages—a reme-
dies system that was created for breach of pension).  ERISA frames the bulk of 
American health insurance as a voluntaristic auxiliary in a broader free market system.  
Id.  It narrowly protects contractual benefits, and has been interpreted to preempt any 
claim relating to a plan that would collect further damages (e.g., state law claims of neg-
ligence, emotional distress, wrongful death, medical malpractice, and bad faith).  Id. at 
968 n.63.  Under ERISA, the “citizen” is a utility maximizing rational actor entitled to 
the protection of a state apparatus for her bargained-for deserts. 
58 See SOMERS, supra note 22, at 2-3, 68-73 (arguing that contractual citizenship 
creates groups of citizens who are included in the accompanying rights and groups 
who are excluded). 
59 It is not surprising, for example, that PPACA itself contains the term “educated 
health care consumer,” defined as “an individual who is knowledgeable about the 
health care system, and has background or experience in making informed decisions 
regarding health, medical, and scientific matters.”  PPACA § 10104(d), 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 18024(e) (West Supp. 1B 2010). 
60 See COHEN, supra note 48, at 29-31, 34. 
HUNTER REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/11/2011  7:35 PM 
1970 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 1955 
C.  Social Security 
When analyzing an American social insurance scheme, the inevit-
able comparison is to Social Security, which obligates each working 
individual to pay a dedicated tax to support the program.61  Although 
now a universal system, Social Security originated as a poverty-
amelioration program, in which Congress silently perpetuated gender, 
race, and income inequalities.62  It was only over time that the Social 
Security Act “established American social citizenship.”63 
Similarly to PPACA, the threshold legal challenge to Social Securi-
ty focused on the constitutionality of its financing component, which, 
unlike the individual mandate in PPACA, was clearly structured as a 
tax.64  The Court found the Social Security Act constitutional pursuant 
to Congress’s taxing power, without having to consider the scope of 
the Commerce Clause.65  Yet the logic of the challenge nonetheless 
 
61 42 U.S.C. § 301 (2006).  Various taxes enacted under the Federal Insurance 
Contributions Act finance the Social Security program.  26 U.S.C. § 3101(a)(2006).  
62 Social Security was originally divided between benefits—framed as earnings 
from worker contributions—and assistance to the needy.  See SUZANNE METTLER, DI-
VIDING CITIZENS:  GENDER AND FEDERALISM IN NEW DEAL PUBLIC POLICY 55-59 (1998) 
(chronicling the evolution of ideas on how to implement the Social Security system).  
Moreover, the system initially excluded agricultural and domestic workers, thus elimi-
nating coverage for half of the African-American population at that time.  See JENNIFER 
KLEIN, FOR ALL THESE RIGHTS:  BUSINESS, LABOR AND THE SHAPING OF AMERICA’S PUBLIC-
PRIVATE WELFARE STATE 104 (2003) (noting that bifurcating Social Security directly 
resulted in the exclusion of several groups, including African-Americans).  
63 METTLER, supra note 62, at 54.  In 1939, Congress expanded Social Security to 
allow benefits greater than the amount that the deceased worker had paid in, thus 
moving away from a “contributory-contractual principle” to a genuine social insurance 
model, in which government assumed the employee’s responsibility to his family by 
providing income security.  Brian R. Grossman et al., One Nation, Interdependent:  Explor-
ing the Boundaries of Citizenship in the History of Social Security and Medicare, in LEAH 
ROGNE ET AL., SOCIAL INSURANCE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE:  SOCIAL SECURITY, MEDICARE, 
AND THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST ENTITLEMENTS 115, 127 (2009). 
64 Then–Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins credited the clarity of constitutional 
authority for Social Security to advice she received in 1934 from Chief Justice Harlan 
Stone:  “The taxing power, my dear, the taxing power.  You can do anything under the 
taxing power.”  Francis Perkins, Sec’y of Labor, Speech at the Social Security Adminis-
tration:  The Roots of Social Security (Oct. 23, 1962), available at http://www.ssa.gov/ 
history/perkins5.html.  
65 Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937).  The Supreme Court left open 
the question of the constitutionality of the tax on individual employees, limiting its 
holding to the claims brought by employers.  See id. at 645 (stating only that the tax on 
employers was valid).  Plaintiffs in the challenges to PPACA accept the Social Security 
tax as a constitutionally legitimate exercise of congressional taxing power, but argue 
that Helvering provides no support for PPACA because PPACA is financed by a 
mandate to purchase a private commodity, rather than to pay monies to the govern-
ment.  See, e.g., Memorandum of the Cato Inst. et al., supra note 43, at 19 (“Although 
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parallels the political arguments being made against PPACA, and the 
Court’s reasoning in response implies the kind of civic solidarity justi-
fication that could be mounted to defend the new law in 
non-doctrinal arguments. 
In the Social Security case, the First Circuit had ruled the Act un-
constitutional as a violation of the Tenth Amendment, on the ground 
that providing assistance to the elderly and poor was a power reserved 
to the states and not legitimately within Congressional authority.66  
Moreover, it found that “a tax imposed to benefit slightly over half of 
the people over sixty-five years of age and who are the care or burden 
of the states cannot be said to be imposed for the general welfare of 
the United States.”67 
Justice Cardozo’s opinion for the Supreme Court reasoned that al-
though “Congress may spend money in aid of the ‘general wel-
fare[,]’ . . . [t]he line must still be drawn between one welfare and 
another, between particular and general.”68  The Court rejected a 
“static” concept of the general welfare:  “Needs that were narrow or 
parochial a century ago may be interwoven in our day with the 
well-being of the Nation.  What is critical or urgent changes with the 
times.”69  The Court also found the new system to be an appropriate 
response to urgent need: 
Spreading from State to State, unemployment is an ill not particular but 
general, which may be checked, if Congress so determines, by the re-
sources of the Nation . . . . [Nation-wide harm results regardless of] 
whether men are thrown out of work because there is no longer work to 
do or because the disabilities of age make them incapable of doing it.  
Rescue becomes necessary irrespective of the cause.
70
 
These passages in Helvering performed significant work in the So-
cial Security debate and are extraordinarily rich for present purposes 
as well.  The Court invokes the norms of reciprocal and collective re-
sponsibility—“rescue”—that comprise the ethos of citizenship.  Fur-
ther, Justice Cardozo uses the language of emergency—a “nation-wide 
 
the term ‘excise’ now covers virtually every internal revenue tax except the income tax, 
the individual mandate penalty (unlike Social Security) is not a tax on employment or 
other action—it ‘taxes’ inaction.”).  
66 Davis v. Edison Elec. Illuminated Co. of Bos., 89 F.2d 393, 395 (1st Cir. 1937), 
rev’d sub nom. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937). 
67 Id. at 395. 
68 Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, and United States v. 
Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936)). 
69 Id. at 641. 
70 Id. 
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calamity . . . [s]preading from State to State”71—to ground the necessity 
for collective mobilization of the sort associated with self-defense and 
national security.  The opinion frames the threat as one to the nation as 
a whole, requiring a specifically national response, warning of the ha-
zards of relying on multiple state old-age pension systems, and caution-
ing that “[o]nly a power that is national can serve the interests of all.”72 
Today, paying Social Security taxes is rarely questioned as falling 
outside an American’s reasonable expectation of the obligations of  
citizenship, even though Social Security is certainly not essential to the 
existence of any government.  Yet the program functions as an institu-
tion or technology of societal solidarity at a sufficiently deep level that 
it constitutes part of the social meaning of citizenship. 
Indeed, political scientist Angela Campbell, who has studied So-
cial Security extensively, concludes that it has been a major factor in 
making seniors the “[ü]ber-citizens” of American politics.73  On other 
political issues, senior engagement is no higher than that of other 
persons; it is the specific interest in Social Security that has led to a 
relatively larger political presence for that demographic group.74  
Campbell credits program design and administration, as well as fi-
nancial support provided by the benefits, with having created the 
conditions that have produced this result.75  Most impressively, Social 
Security has produced a phenomenon in which low-income benefi-
ciaries have become more active than high-income seniors on issues 
specific to Social Security.76 
Engagement by participants has led, in turn, to modifications that 
have expanded the scope of the program.77  Social Security created an 
identifiable constituency group that attracted interest-group entre-
preneurs and political parties, who in turn mobilized greater levels of 
engagement by program enrollees, who themselves identified gaps in 
coverage that require additional political action.78  This process effec-
tively transformed the low-income elderly—a socially anonymous and 
 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 644. 
73 ANDREA LOUISE CAMPBELL, HOW POLICIES MAKE CITIZENS:  SENIOR POLITICAL 
ACTIVISM AND THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 2 (2003). 
74 See id. at 48 (“[S]eniors’ general political engagement is not higher than that of 
nonseniors.”). 
75 Id. at 136. 
76 Id. at 39. 
77 Id. at 92. 
78 Id. at 77. 
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diffuse group—into a political power base that became politically leg-
ible as discrete and organized, even while remaining diffuse.79 
The examples of Social Security and New Deal citizen consumer 
institutions illustrate the power of law to shape cognition and under-
standing in situations in which meaning is ambiguous and malleable.  
Social insurance programs can redefine concrete reality and, in the 
process, alter popular expectations of what are appropriate attitudes 
and behaviors. 
II.  THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE AS LINCHPIN AND SIGNIFIER 
A robust debate about the obligations of citizenship has emerged 
as part of the political discourse surrounding constitutional challenges 
to PPACA.  In this Part, I describe the structural and symbolic impor-
tance of the individual mandate to the overall reform effort and to the 
citizenship-linked meanings of the legislation.  Although the provision 
creating the individual mandate accounted for much of the resistance 
to the bill, its proponents insisted on its inclusion as the cornerstone 
of the legislation because it provided a mechanism to address a dys-
functional insurance market.80 
On the surface, the litigation over whether it is constitutional to 
require individuals to purchase health insurance policies concerns the 
scope of the Commerce and the Necessary and Proper Clauses, as well 
as the applicability of the taxing power.  In the subtext to those argu-
ments are the radically different visions of the meaning of the social 
obligations of citizenship that are fueling popular understandings and 
debates over the social meaning of the new law. 
A.  Economic Necessity 
In the years leading up to the enactment of PPACA, two economic 
dynamics dominated the health insurance market:  prohibitive cost 
(with premiums increasing at a faster rate than the rate of growth in 
income) and decreasing participation (forty-six million uninsured in 
2007, with one in four households forgoing necessary medical care 
 
79 Id. at 112-14. 
80 See, e.g., Press Release, House Comm. on Ways and Means, Health Reform in the 
21st Century:  Insurance Market Reforms (Apr. 15, 2009) (quoting Ways and Means 
Committee Chairman Charles Rangel as saying that “America’s health insurance mar-
ket is dysfunctional,” evidenced by “the 87 million people who went without health in-
surance during the past two years and the millions more who have insurance that is 
increasingly unaffordable or inadequate”). 
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due to cost).81  Expanding access to coverage required reforming two 
profit-boosting strategies that underlay these problems:  medical und-
erwriting and discrimination based on preexisting conditions.  The 
mandate was essential to PPACA’s structure for tightening regulatory 
control without abandoning a market-based health insurance system. 
Medical underwriting—structuring premiums inversely with health 
status—created an insurance landscape that made coverage increa-
singly unaffordable to those most likely to need care.  Thus, to expand 
coverage to the sickest Americans, Congress had to eliminate under-
writing and require insurers to adhere to community-rated premiums 
(e.g., to charge all beneficiaries with the same premium, subject only 
to age variation).82  In doing so, Congress sought not only to increase 
affordability of coverage, but also to incentivize insurers to design and 
implement effective cost-containment strategies, thereby controlling 
growth in national health care expenditures.83 
Discrimination based on pre-existing conditions (e.g., denying or 
rescinding coverage for health conditions pre-dating policy enroll-
ment) had shut off access to insurance for many patients in imme-
diate need of care.  To facilitate coverage of high-cost health care ser-
vices, Congress required insurers to offer guaranteed issue and 
guaranteed renewal of coverage, and limited insurers’ ability to mask 
unexpected exclusions of coverage in cumbersome contracts.84 In ad-
dition, Congress required coverage of “essential benefits,” and re-
 
81 Id. 
82 See Health Reform in the 21st Century:  Insurance Market Reforms:  Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Ways and Means, 111th Cong. 13 (2009) (statement of Uwe E. Reinhardt, Pro-
fessor, Princeton University) (noting that health care will never be available to “all Amer-
icans on equal terms” as long as insurance companies practiced underwriting, and advo-
cating community-rated premiums instead), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/ 
cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_house_hearings&docid=f:52258.pdf. 
83 Only one percent of patients account for more than one quarter of health care 
spending, with five percent accounting for approximately half.  Samuel H. Zuvekas & 
Joel W. Cohen, Prescription Drugs and the Changing Concentration of Health Care Expendi-
tures, 26 HEALTH AFF. 249, 251 exhibit 2 (2007).  This trend remained consistent even 
through the managed care movement of the 1990s, suggesting that insurers were not 
designing effective cost-containment policies that would constrain national medical 
expenditures.  Id. at 249-50; see also The Tri-Committee Draft Proposal for Health Care Reform, 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 111th Cong. 72 (2009) (statement of Jacob 
Hacker, Co-Director, Berkeley School of Law Center on Health Economic & Family Se-
curity) (explaining how insurance markets compete for the lowest-risk enrollees rather 
than price or quality of care), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/ 
getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_house_hearings&docid=f:50479.pdf. 
84 PPACA sec. 1201, §§ 2702–2703, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300gg-1 to -2 (West Supp. 1A 
2010). 
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stricted the cost-sharing arrangements that had discouraged individu-
als from seeking preventive care before becoming ill.85 
The purpose of prohibiting medical underwriting and discrimina-
tion based on preexisting conditions was to open the insurance market 
to individuals of all health statuses, thereby expanding coverage to many 
of those in greatest need.  Yet requiring insurers to take on high-risk be-
neficiaries at lower cost—without mandating that healthy individuals 
join insurance pools—would have killed the private market by simulta-
neously reducing premium income and increasing expenditures.86 
State-based reforms had demonstrated this effect.  For example, 
Congress considered the experience of New Jersey’s Individual Health 
Coverage Program of 1993, which required insurers to use guaranteed 
issue and community-based ratings on the individual market, but did 
not require uninsured residents to obtain coverage.87  Within a dec-
ade, the state’s insurance market began to flounder, as the proportion 
of high-risk to low-risk beneficiaries increased.88  By failing to require 
healthy individuals to purchase insurance before they fall ill, and sec-
uring affordable rates for people of all health statuses, the law incenti-
vized free riding and prohibited insurers from minimizing adverse sel-
ection.89  In contrast to the New Jersey experience, health reform in 
Massachusetts demonstrated the stability that an individual mandate 
can bring to risk pooling.  Within three years of imposing its mandate, 
Massachusetts experienced an increase in insurance coverage for 
non-elderly adults from 87.5% to 95%.90 
 
85 An essential benefits package, to be defined by the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services, will establish the minimal amount of benefits a plan may offer on the 
exchange.  Id. § 1302(b)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022(b)(1) (West Supp. 1B 2010).  In ad-
dition, plans sold on the exchange must cover at least sixty percent of health care 
costs, id. § 1302(d)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022(d)(1), and out-of-pocket expenditures may 
not exceed $5,000 for an individual or $10,000 for a family. Id. § 1302(c)(1), 42 
U.S.C.A. § 18022(c)(1).  Section 1001 of the Act also amends the Public Health Services 
Act to prohibit cost sharing for evidence-based preventive services.  Id. § 1001, 42 
U.S.C.A. 300gg-13(a) (West Supp. 1A 2010). 
86 See Health Reform in the 21st Century, supra note 82, at 13 (statement of Uwe E. Rein-
hardt) (arguing that the “imposition of community-rate premiums and guaranteed issue on a 
market of competing private insurers will inexorably drive that market into extinction”). 
87 See id. at 13 n.4 (citing Alan C. Monheit et al., Community Rating and Sustainable 
Individual Health Insurance Markets in New Jersey, 23 HEALTH AFF. 167 (2004)).  
88 See Monheit et al., supra note 87, at 169 (describing a trend of enrollment con-
sistent with “a marketwide adverse-selection death spiral”).  
89 See id. (noting that insurers have been forced to retain “potentially adverse 
health risks”). 
90 SHARON K. LONG & KAREN STOCKLEY, HEALTH REFORM IN MASSACHUSETTS:  AN 
UPDATE AS OF FALL 2009, at iii (2010); see also PPACA § 10106(a), 42 U.S.C.A. 
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Taking into account the experience of state-based insurance 
reform, Congress used a mandate to mitigate the effects of eliminating 
the insurance industry’s primary means of maximizing profit.91  The 
mandate allows insurers to effectively pool risk:  offsetting the cost of 
insuring high-risk beneficiaries at affordable rates with the profits 
earned on healthy beneficiaries.92  In other words, the mandate elimi-
nates two market failures:  free-riding and improper risk analysis.93 
Congress also found the mandate important for addressing issues 
related to employer-sponsored coverage:  continuity in coverage and 
variability in plans.  In light of the increase in lateral career move-
ment, Congress concluded that a mandate would incentivize em-
ployees to remain covered during the transition between old and new 
employer plans.94  It would also enhance the accessibility of coverage 
for the self-employed, unemployed, or underemployed, or those work-
ing in small businesses that lack risk-pooling capacity.95  PPACA cre-
ates state-based health insurance exchanges in order to provide a ve-
hicle for obtaining coverage outside of large employer-sponsored or 
public plans.96  Without the mandate, the financial stability of the ex-
changes might falter under the force of adverse selection.  Thus, the 
primary role of the individual mandate is to stabilize the private 
health insurance market.97 
 
§ 18091(a)(2)(D) (West Supp. 1B 2010) (describing the “Effects on the National 
Economy and Interstate Commerce” of the individual mandate and stating that “[i]n 
Massachusetts, a similar requirement has strengthened private employer-based cover-
age:  despite the economic downturn, the number of workers offered employer-based 
coverage has actually increased.”).   
91 See Health Reform in the 21st Century, supra note 82, at 9, 101-02 (noting that 
health reform in New Jersey resulted in an unraveling of the insurance market due to 
the lack of a mandate).  
92 See id. at 107 (testimony of William Vaughan, Senior Policy Analyst, Consumers Un-
ion) (noting that a mandate removes the business necessity of imposing limitations the 
coverage of on pre-existing conditions); id. at 118-19 (statement of the American Academy 
of Actuaries) (noting that with larger risk pools, insurers can charge lower rates). 
93 Representative Schwartz discussed the problem of improper risk analysis seen in 
young adults tending to underestimate the future risk of accumulating medical costs.  
Id. at 106-07 (statement of Rep. Allyson Schwartz, H. Comm. on Ways and Means).    
94 There is often either a six-month waiting period to enroll in a new employer’s 
plan or an annual thirty to sixty day enrollment window.  Id. at 103-05. 
95 See id. at 35-37, 40, 94, 110-16 (discussing insurance barriers for those unable 
to pool risk).    
96 PPACA § 1311(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(b) (West Supp. 1B 2010). 
97 But the individual mandate will not remedy all troubles of adverse selection with-
in the insurance exchanges.  See TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, COMMONWEALTH FUND, 
HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES AND THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT:  EIGHT DIFFICULT IS-
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B.  A Signification Contest Between Economic Liberty 
and the Social Compact 
Lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of PPACA have targeted 
the individual mandate.98  The resolution of these claims, almost cer-
tainly by the Supreme Court, will turn on whether the requirement to 
purchase health insurance is an appropriate exercise of Congressional 
power under either the Commerce Clause or the taxing power.  There 
seems to be little dispute that this precise form of federal mandate—
that individuals must purchase certain private goods or pay a penalty—
is unprecedented.99  The Court’s resolution may depend on whether 
the Justices calibrate their analysis at a greater or lesser level of generali-
ty, by deciding whether the PPACA mandate is a reasonable way to re-
gulate a trillion-dollar economic subsystem or whether it is more like an 
authoritarian command that each individual must buy a health club 
membership.  In my view, for reasons well stated by Mark Hall,100 there 
is no basis for the Court to conclude that the Act is unconstitutional. 
My focus in this Article is not on the doctrinal analysis of the debate 
that will be before the Supreme Court but on the underlying social 
messages and meanings that are implicated in that debate.  In cultural 
terms, the Court will have to decide whether PPACA is about preserving 
 
SUES 9 (2010) (describing how the continued existence of a market outside the ex-
change will leave open the possibility of adverse selection).   
98 See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 10-091, 
2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. 
Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010); New Jersey Physicians, Inc. v. Obama, No. 10-1489, 2010 
WL 5060597 (D.N.J. Dec. 8, 2010); Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, No. 10-0015, 2010 WL 
4860299 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010); U.S. Citizens Ass’n. v. Sebelius, No. 10-1065, 2010 
WL 4947043 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 22, 2010); Shreeve v. Obama, No. 10-0071, 2010 WL 
4628177 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 4, 2010); Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dept. of Health & 
Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Fla. 2010); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Ob-
ama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010).  A number of cases were also filed in 
which no court opinion had been issued as of April 5, 2011.  See Amended Complaint, 
Bryant v. Holder, No. 10-0076 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 4, 2011); Complaint, Coons v. Geithner, 
No. 10-1714 (D. Ariz. Aug. 12, 2010); Complaint, Calvey v. Obama, No. 10-0353 (W.D. 
Okla. Aug. 6, 2010); Complaint, Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Sebelius, No. 
10-0499 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2010).  
99 See McCollum, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1164 (quoting a 1994 CBO memorandum de-
termining that the individual mandate would be “an unprecedented form of federal 
action”); see generally JENNIFER STAMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40725, REQUIRING 
INDIVIDUALS TO OBTAIN HEALTH INSURANCE:  A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 1 (Dec. 16, 
2010) (noting that Congress has never required the transfer of money to private par-
ties except in return for a privilege, such as driving cars). 
100 See Mark A. Hall, Commerce Clause Challenges to Health Care Reform, 159 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1825, 1829-30 (2011) (arguing that Congress is permitted to regulate the insurance 
industry and that the individual mandate is necessary and proper to that permission). 
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a fiscally and otherwise healthy collectivity—the nation—or about pre-
serving an individually defined bundle of rights.  Perhaps subconscious-
ly, the Justices must frame the relationship between government and 
individual access to the health care system as primarily either about col-
lective governance or about fostering individual self-governance.  Fun-
damentally, the legitimacy of the individual mandate turns on whether 
the Court will accept that a sacrifice of individual economic liberty is 
justified by an obligation to contribute to the common good that ac-
companies membership in the American political community. 
The centrality of economic liberty claims to the individual 
mandate debate is evident from the current litigation, in which indi-
vidual plaintiffs have described the harm they suffer from the alleged-
ly unconstitutional exercise of power in economic terms.  In Florida ex 
rel. McCollum v. United States Department of Health and Human Services, 
for example, one plaintiff asserted that he had no health insurance 
nor any intention of purchasing any, and that, further, “he is, and ex-
pects to remain, financially able to pay for his own healthcare services 
if and as needed.”101  In Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, the District 
Court found that the individual plaintiffs had standing because of the 
present injury of 
being compelled to “reorganize their [financial] affairs” . . . . Plaintiffs’ 
decision to forego certain spending today, so that they will have the funds 
to pay for health insurance when the Individual Mandate takes effect in 
2014, are injuries fairly traceable to the Act for the purposes of conferring 
standing.  There is nothing improbable about the contention that the In-
dividual Mandate is causing plaintiffs to feel economic pressure today.
102
 
These assertions recall two cases decided by the Supreme Court 
slightly more than a century ago which also concerned the legitimacy 
of a health-related mandate grounded in social welfare policy.  In  
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the Court upheld a requirement that every 
resident of Cambridge, Massachusetts, be vaccinated for smallpox, re-
jecting the argument that it violated bodily liberty.103  Less than two 
months later, in Lochner v. New York, the Court upheld the primacy of 
economic liberty and the right of contract by invalidating a law that 
 
101 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1145. 
102 720 F. Supp. 2d at 888-89.  
103 See 197 U.S. 11, 12-13, 26-27 (1905) (“[T]he liberty secured by the Constitu-
tion . . . does not import an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all 
circumstances, wholly freed from restraint.”). 
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set a maximum daily number for hours worked, a law that looked like 
a present-day occupational health and safety regulation.104 
The contemporary controversy over the legitimacy of the individ-
ual mandate in PPACA resonates with these two constitutional land-
marks, not at the level of doctrine or precedent but in the realm of 
social meaning.  At bottom, both Jacobson and Lochner concerned how 
much sacrifice of liberty could be demanded of the individual by the 
state in the interest of furthering the social compact, specifically in the 
context of health.  In each case, the Court had to determine how di-
rect or necessary the sacrifice of a right was to achieving the common 
good.  In Jacobson, the Court framed the justification for coerced vac-
cination as necessary, literally, for community survival, a linkage that 
made sense in the context of an epidemic of infectious disease at the 
turn of the last century:105  “Upon the principle of self-defense, of par-
amount necessity, a community has the right to protect itself against 
an epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its members.”106  
The Court also described the individual’s duty as part of a social com-
pact with the state: 
There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject 
for the common good . . . . This court has more than once recognized it 
as a fundamental principle that “persons and property are subjected to 
all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general com-
fort, health, and prosperity of the State; of the perfect right of the legis-
lature to do which no question ever was, or upon acknowledged general 
principles ever can be made, so far as natural persons are concerned.”
107
 
By contrast, the same Court in Lochner viewed the maximum 
hours law as an illegitimate ruse used to curtail the dynamics of the 
labor market: 
The act is not, within any fair meaning of the term, a health law, but is 
an illegal interference with the rights of individuals, both employers and 
employés [sic], to make contracts regarding labor upon such terms as 
 
104 See 198 U.S. 45, 61 (1905), abrogated by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 
379 (1937) (“The Act is not, within any fair meaning of the term, a health law, but is 
an illegal interference with the rights of individuals . . . .”).  
105 See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Impact of Vaccines Universally Recom-
mended for Children—United States, 1900–1998, 281 JAMA 1482, 1482 (1999) (“At the 
beginning of the 20th century, infectious diseases were widely prevalent in the United 
States and exacted an enormous toll on the population.  For example, in 1900, 21,064 
smallpox cases were reported, and 894 patients died.”).   
106 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 27. 
107 Id. at 26 (citations omitted) (quoting Thorpe v. Rutland & Burlington R.R., 27 
Vt. 140, 150 (1854)). 
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they may think best, or which they may agree upon with the other parties 
to such contracts.
108
 
The Court’s reasoning in both cases, together with the citizenship cas-
es and Helvering, demonstrates that as context and historical circum-
stance shift, so do the formulations of a citizen’s duty. 
There are, of course, many ways to distinguish these two cases 
from the PPACA lawsuits.  Perhaps the most important difference is 
that Jacobson and Lochner involved the invocation of a state’s police 
power,109 rather than the invocation by Congress of its powers under 
Article I.  And of course, the Lochner era has long since ended;110 un-
less plaintiffs can demonstrate that a noneconomic, fundamental li-
berty interest is at stake, the United States need only show that PPA-
CA’s individual mandate satisfies rational basis review.111  With evidence 
that Congress went to considerable lengths to clarify that the mandate 
is necessary to the entire statutory scheme, the Michigan court had lit-
tle difficulty dismissing plaintiffs’ substantive due process claims.112  
Thus, the doctrinal resolution of the constitutionality of the mandate 
centers on the Commerce Clause and tax power, augmented by the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, and not on recognition of an economic 
liberty interest. 
At the level of social meaning, however, PPACA challenges are not 
about federalism, the Commerce Clause, or taxation.  Just as today I 
would doubt that a person quarantined after arriving on a flight from 
New York to Los Angeles would much care whether federal or state 
health authorities ordered the quarantine,113 I doubt that the final rul-
ing on the constitutionality of the individual mandate will be unders-
tood as resolving the question of which level of government has the 
power to force an individual into a community-rating insurance sys-
tem.  Rather, the popular understanding likely will center on the issue 
 
108 198 U.S. at 61. 
109 See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 25 (“According to settled principles, the police power 
of a State must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations . . . as will pro-
tect the public health and the public safety.”); Lochner, 198 U.S. at 54 (describing the 
act at issue as an “assumed exercise of [the state’s] police power”). 
110 See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597 (1977) (“The holding in Lochner has 
been implicitly overruled many times.”); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 
421, 423 (1952) (recognizing the implied overruling of Lochner’s holding).  
111 See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 891-92 (E.D. Mich. 
2010) (stating that the court should determine only whether there is a rational basis for 
the conclusion that the regulated activities substantially affect interstate commerce). 
112 Id. at 893-95 (explaining Congress’s rational basis for passing PPACA). 
113 Federal quarantine authority is limited to situations in which an individual with 
a communicable disease may cross state lines.  See 42 U.S.C. § 264(d) (2006). 
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of whether persons can be compelled by any level of government to 
participate in a social insurance compact for the common good, or 
whether, when the rational economic choice of particular individuals 
would be to go it alone, a requirement to obtain health insurance 
would amount to what the Lochner court called “meddlesome interfe-
rence[] with the rights of the individual.”114 
In the debates over the validity of PPACA that occur outside the 
confines of litigation briefs, these broader themes of social meaning 
dominate.  One main strategy of PPACA’s opponents has been to per-
suade legislatures in six states to adopt “health insurance freedom” 
laws that would prohibit any individual mandate, state or federal.115  In 
the 2010 election, voters in Arizona and Oklahoma amended their 
state constitutions to add the language of “health insurance free-
dom.”116  The primary purpose of these amendments is not the crea-
tion of new law.  “Health insurance freedom” language adds nothing 
to disputes over whether the mandate exceeds the power of Congress.  
It is a makeweight for purposes of Tenth Amendment analysis.  If the 
individual mandate is found to be within the scope of Article I powers, 
it will trump any and all conflicting state laws by virtue of the Supre-
macy Clause.  The value of the “health insurance freedom” campaign 
 
114 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 61 (1905), abrogated by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. 
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
115 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11 (LEXIS through 2010 Reg. Sess. 2011); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 39-9003 (Supp. 2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:10186 (Supp. 15 2011); 
MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.330 (West, Westlaw through April 13, 2011); VA. CODE ANN. art. 
4.1, § 38.2-3430.1:1 (Supp. 6A 2010).  The American Legislative Exchange Council, an 
organization that “advocates limited government and free markets,” provided instruc-
tion to several states in developing these laws.  Monica Davey, Health Care Overhaul and 
Mandatory Coverage Stir States’ Rights Claims, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2009, at A25; see also 
Press Release, Am. Legislative Exch. Council, Freedom of Choice in Health Care Act, 
http://www.alec.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=FOCA&Template=/CM/HTMLDisp
lay.cfm&ContentID=15323 (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (noting that forty-two states have 
utilized this model act in introducing or announcing health insurance freedom laws).  
The language of the Virginia statute is typical: 
No resident of this Commonwealth, regardless of whether he has or is eligible 
for health insurance coverage under any policy or program provided by or 
through his employer, or a plan sponsored by the Commonwealth or the fed-
eral government, shall be required to obtain or maintain a policy of individual 
insurance coverage except as required by a court or the Department of Social 
Services where an individual is named a party in a judicial or administrative 
proceeding. 
VA CODE ANN. § 38.2-3430.1:1.  
116 See ARIZ. CONST. art. XXVII, § 2 (stating that no Arizonan shall be forced “to 
participate in any health care system” or be required to pay a fine for paying directly 
for health care); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 37 (providing essentially the same guarantee). 
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to its proponents lies in the very process of enactment—in the oppor-
tunity created by the legislative debates and electoral campaigns to 
build public participation in the discourse of individual liberty as su-
perior to collective obligation.117 
III.  CITIZENSHIP PRACTICES AND THE PATIENT PROTECTION 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
In this Part, I argue for using a concept of citizenship practices to 
understand the socio-legal relationship between individuals and social 
insurance programs.  As I use it, the term “citizenship practices” in-
corporates the functional components of citizen-like activities, such as 
participation in governance, and also captures the ways in which the de-
sign of social welfare laws shapes individual and social understandings 
of identity and belonging.  I describe some of the most important struc-
tural design questions that remain open for decision during the im-
plementation phase of PPACA, with a focus on points that will enhance 
or curb the potential for citizen engagement in governance.  I close this 
Part with commentary on possible future social meanings of PPACA. 
A.  The Concept of “Citizenship Practices” 
Throughout this Article, I have sought to build on the usefulness 
of citizenship as a metaphor without becoming ensnared in its formal 
definition.  The difficulties of navigating that tension lead me to pro-
pose the term “citizenship practices” as a better tool for signifying a 
multi-dimensional, nontechnical, and normative concept of citizen-
ship, rather than stretching citizenship as a metaphor so far that the 
word becomes almost meaningless. 
I intend “citizenship practices” to denote both concrete activities 
and the social meanings associated with citizenship.  Specifically, I 
mean it to denote the discourses, institutions, and statutory programs 
 
117 See, e.g., LAURA INGRAHAM, THE OBAMA DIARIES 119 (2010) (expressing the 
point of view that PPACA infringes on constitutional rights); BILL O’REILLY, PINHEADS 
AND PATRIOTS:  WHERE YOU STAND IN THE AGE OF OBAMA 57-60 (2010) (describing 
PPACA and arguing that it passed only because of political maneuvering); MICHAEL SA-
VAGE, TRICKLE UP POVERTY 115-53 (2010) (discussing PPACA’s shortcomings in language 
aimed at a lay audience); Sally C. Pipes, Repeal the Individual Mandate of Obamacare, HU-
MANEVENTS.COM (Aug. 12, 2010), http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=38517 
(describing the individual mandate as “an egregious assualt on our economic liberty”); 
The Rush Limbaugh Show:  Battle over Obamacare Repeal Is Essentially a Debate About Liberty 
(Premier Radio Networks Dec. 14, 2010), available at http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/ 
home/daily/site_121410/content/01125113.guest.html (arguing that PPACA in-
fringes on the American people’s liberty by forcing them to buy health care). 
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that comprise a network of social structures.  This network in turn 
gives birth to the constellation of rights, obligations, and belonging 
that we associate with citizenship.  These structures exist within the 
state, the market, and contemporary civil society.  “Citizenship prac-
tices” manifest in narrative, identities, and institutions, as well as laws. 
I specifically intend the term to build on the concept of “policy 
feedback”—the ways that “policies, once enacted, restructure subse-
quent political processes”118—as well as on the idea of citizenship as 
metaphor.  Theda Skocpol, a leading developer of the idea of policy 
feedback, has described such effects as not only those that could trans-
form state administrative capacity but also those that can affect the 
identities, political goals, and capabilities of social groups.119  PPACA 
will surely fulfill both possibilities, but it is the latter set of effects that 
overlaps with citizenship practices, insofar as they help to frame narra-
tives about who is responsible for what and why, and who has a legiti-
mate expectation of participatory engagement in policymaking. 
Policy and program design are key forces in structuring the ways 
in which individuals and social welfare systems interact.  The particu-
lars of such design will shape whether mechanisms exist that can 
force, enhance, or limit public participation in deliberation, as well as 
how successful such mechanisms will be.  In turn, answers to those ques-
tions will foretell the extent to which interest groups will form and flou-
rish around the needs of program constituents.  From these roots, per-
ceptions will arise about how, why, and for whom the programs operate. 
B.  The Design of Exchanges Under PPACA 
In the health care arena, alternative modes of citizenship practices 
could be especially important.  Voters elect officials who determine 
health policies, but it is usually not possible to unbundle health from 
other issues.  Moreover, citizen engagement with respect to elections 
is low, as captured by Michael Walzer’s description of citizens as “spec-
tators who vote.”120 Exchange-level entities, on the other hand, could 
provide more localized opportunities for developing citizenship skills 
such as self-governance and leadership, as well as a venue in which 
smaller decisions may ultimately shape larger and more distant poli-
 
118 THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS:  THE POLITICAL ORI-
GINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 58 (1992). 
119 Id. 
120 Michael Walzer, The Civil Society Argument, in THE CITIZENSHIP DEBATES 291, 
300 (Gershon Shafir ed., 1998).  
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cymaking.  Two critically important issues for the development of citi-
zenship practices and policy feedback dynamics under PPACA will be 
whether the new institutions created pursuant to PPACA could also 
create potential sites for policy entrepreneurs seeking to maximize 
democratic input into health policy to intervene, and whether these 
institutions will facilitate an allegiance to norms of social insurance on 
the part of those who participate in them. 
Section 1311 of PPACA requires states to establish “American 
Health Benefit Exchanges” by January 1, 2014.121  PPACA distinguishes 
between exchanges for individual purchasers of health insurance and 
exchanges for small businesses seeking to find coverage for their em-
ployees (the “Small Business Health Options Program”), and allows 
states to choose between creating two exchanges or one that will serve 
both markets.122  Alternatively, states may join with one another to 
create regional insurance exchanges,123 offering consumers increased 
economies of scale and portability, or may opt into a federally run ex-
change.124  In addition to creating a competitive marketplace for in-
surance and pooling risk for groups that traditionally have been hard 
to cover, the exchanges will also channel eligible individuals into Me-
dicaid, CHIP, and other public programs.125 
PPACA provides initial funding for the exchanges,126 but leaves 
states considerable discretion in structuring the design and implemen-
tation thereof, creating a fundamentally federalist system for procuring 
 
121 PPACA § 1311, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(b) (West Supp. 1B 2010).  If by January 1, 
2013, the Secretary of Health and Human Services determines that a state has not tak-
en the necessary steps toward establishing an exchange and will not have a functional 
exchange in place by 2014, the Secretary will establish and operate an exchange in that 
state.  Id. § 1321(c), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18041(c).       
122 Id. § 1311, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(b)(1)–(2). 
123 Id., 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(f)(1).  New Mexico, for example, interprets the bene-
fits of a regional exchange to include increased long-run efficiencies and expanded 
portability for residents.  NEW MEXICO HUMAN SERVS. DEP’T, IMPLEMENTING FEDERAL 
HEALTH CARE REFORM—A ROADMAP FOR NEW MEXICO 26 (2010). 
124 See PPACA § 1321(c) (authorizing the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services to establish exchanges in noncompliant states after January 1, 2013).  
125 Id. § 1311, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(d)(4). 
126 Id., 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(a).  The Health Insurance Exchange Planning grant 
provides states with funding for economic modeling, actuarial analyses, data collection, 
and identification of necessary resources such as information technology to create an ex-
change.  Id., 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(a)(1)–(3).  Forty-eight states and the District of Colum-
bia received the first round of grants in September 2010.  OFFICE OF CONSUMER INFO. & 
INS. OVERSIGHT, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., INITIAL GUIDANCE TO STATES 
ON EXCHANGES (2010), available at http://www.healthcare.gov/center/regulations/ 
guidance_to_states_on_exchanges.html.   
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health insurance for individuals and small businesses.  It is likely that 
most states will exercise the opportunity to create their own exchanges 
in order to streamline coordination with related state programs such as 
Medicaid and to tailor the exchange to their population’s needs.127 
With little statutory guidance on exchange functions, structure, 
and governance, states have a great deal of discretion to exercise in a 
short window of time.128  The most likely models exist in Massachu-
setts, Utah, and states that, like California, were among the earliest to 
create exchanges.129  In 2006, when Massachusetts imposed its own 
mandate on state residents, it created the Commonwealth Health In-
surance Connector to help individuals purchase affordable cover-
age.130  The Massachusetts Connector provided a template for the ex-
change system established in PPACA.131  Utah created a similar 
exchange in 2009,132 and California enacted legislation in 2010 creat-
ing the California Health Benefit Exchange.133  These three models 
are likely to guide other states as they make decisions regarding im-
portant governance issues in the process of creating PPACA compliant 
exchanges.  Two such issues are whether an exchange will act as a 
clearinghouse or as an active purchaser of plans, and whether the ex-
change will be housed in a government agency or a nonprofit entity. 
 
127 For example, New Mexico’s strategic plan for health care reform has identified 
these reasons as sufficient to justify the expense of establishing its own exchange.  NEW 
MEXICO HUMAN SERVS. DEP’T, supra note 123, at 25-26; see also ROBERT CAREY, STATE 
COVERAGE INITIATIVES, HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES:  KEY ISSUES FOR STATE IM-
PLEMENTATION 2-3 (2010), available at http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/70388.pdf 
(describing why states will likely prefer to create their own exchanges, rather than be 
subject to a federally run exchange).  In addition, the New Mexico Human Services 
Department has noted that “ambitious federal timelines” may prohibit development of 
a regional exchange.  NEW MEXICO HUMAN SERVS. DEP’T, supra note 123, at 26-27.   
128 See JOST, supra note 97, at 5 (noting that states face a “daunting list of tasks”). 
129 See Rachel Brand, Facing the Future:  Setting up Health Insurance Exchanges is One of 
the Big, Early Tasks for Lawmakers, STATE LEGISLATURES, at 22, 24-26, Oct.–Nov. 2010 
(discussing early state efforts at exchange creation). 
130  MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 176Q, § 3 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009).   
131 See STAFF OF SENATE FIN. COMM., 111TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF POLICY OPTIONS:  
EXPANDING HEALTH CARE COVERAGE:  PROPOSALS TO PROVIDE AFFORDABLE COVERAGE 
TO ALL AMERICANS 4 (2009) (“[T]he Health Insurance Exchange concept is similar in 
some ways to the Massachusetts Connector . . . .”). 
132 UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-2-218(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010). 
133 California Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, ch. 655, sec. 3, 
§ 15438(s)(1), 2010 Cal. Stat. 3553, 3556 (to be codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE § 15438). 
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1.  Regulation 
States must determine how much oversight they will exercise over 
health insurance plans offered through their exchanges.  PPACA re-
stricts entry to the exchange to those plans whose availability in an ex-
change serves the “interests of qualified individuals and qualified em-
ployers,”134 those that offer at least silver and gold benefit tiers, and 
those that meet additional criteria to be established by the Secretary.135  
States may opt to impose additional participation requirements on 
plans, allowing the exchange to serve as a gatekeeper to maximize 
quality and minimize cost.136 
Some states may follow the Utah Health Exchange model, and 
provide a “clearinghouse” of health insurance plans that meet the 
federal minimum standards.137  This model, which could be analo-
gized to various online commercial websites, would allow consumers 
the greatest number of options, but may fall short of providing them 
with the best value for their health care dollars by not imposing  
further requirements. 
States that choose to impose greater regulation on the plans of-
fered through the exchange could adopt what has been termed a “se-
lective contracting agent” model.138  Under such a model, the ex-
change would evaluate insurance plans from different corners and of-
offer only selected plans.139  The Massachusetts Connector operates 
this way,140 and has thus far granted entry to nine health plans.  Cali-
fornia’s exchange will also selectively contract with plans to create a 
market of “optimal combination of choice, value, quality, and ser-
 
134 PPACA § 1311, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(e)(1) (West Supp. 1B 2010). 
135 Id. § 1301, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18021(a)(1)(c)(ii). 
136 Initial guidance from the Department of Health and Human Services endorses 
the variety of models, leaving the choice up to states.  See OFFICE OF CONSUMER INFO. & 
INS. OVERSIGHT, supra note 126 (“States have a range of options for how the Exchange 
operates from an ‘active purchaser’ model . . . to an ‘open marketplace’ model . . . .”). 
137 Utah’s exchange model has been described as functioning as a “market orga-
nizer.”  See ROBERT CAREY, STATE COVERAGE INITIATIVES, PREPARING FOR HEALTH 
REFORM:  THE ROLE OF THE HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGE 4-5 (2010), available at 
http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/57093.pdf (describing how the exchange acts as a 
source of information about available plans, provides structure to the market, and 
serves as a broker by handling billing and collection). 
138 CAREY, supra note 127, at 12.  
139 Id. 
140 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 176Q, § 3(a)(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009) (noting that 
the Connector’s purpose is to establish procedures for selecting and certifying plans to 
be offered).  
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vice,”141 limiting participation to those plans offering five tiers of cov-
erage (ranging from catastrophic-only to platinum coverage) both on 
and off of the exchange.142  Other states struggling with rising health 
care costs may find this selective contracting option attractive, as it will 
allow regulators to best control premium growth.143 
Finally, states could take more initiative in governing which plans 
will be offered through their exchanges by acting as “active purchas-
ers” of the health insurance plans offered.144  Under such a structure, 
the state exchanges would be able to operate as large employers al-
ready do, negotiating prices for a large risk pool and offering access 
only to the plans with the best bids. 
One policy analyst has noted that these latter two models allow the 
exchanges to fulfill their full potential as “critical forces in the market 
to keep prices down and generate better quality care for consumers, 
employers and taxpayers.”145  Though these models envision a greater 
role, and thus greater effort, by the states, the models likely will pro-
vide consumers with a more streamlined way to purchase health in-
surance that will be valuable to them and responsive to their needs.  
Regardless of the model chosen, after allowing a plan to enter the 
exchange, a state must regularly account for premium increases in 
determining its continued viability for the exchange, thereby helping 
to control price.146 
 
141 CAL. HEALTH CARE FOUND., CALIFORNIA’S INSURANCE EXCHANGE:  EXPERTS 
TACKLE THE BIG QUESTIONS 6-7 (2010) (quoting Sumi Sousa, Special Assistant to As-
sembly Speaker John A. Perez). 
142 See id. at 11 (noting that the California exchange requirements will exceed 
federal requirements).  
143 New Mexico has identified cost control as a reason to consider limiting ex-
change participation to plans restricting premium growth or offering other cost con-
taining measures to keep premiums low.  NEW MEXICO HUMAN SERVS. DEP’T, supra 
note 127, at 25-26. 
144 See CAREY, supra note 137, at 5 (listing California’s PacAdvantage and the Texas 
Insurance Purchasing Alliance as examples of the active purchaser models). 
145 NAIC Exchange Subgroup Public Hearing ( July 22, 2010) (statement of Sabrina 
Corlette, Georgetown University Health Policy Institute) (on file with author). 
146 See PPACA §§ 1311, 10104(f)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(e)(2) (West Supp. 1B 
2010) (“The Exchange shall require health plans seeking certification . . . to submit a 
justification for any premium increase prior to implementation of the increase . . . . 
The Exchange shall take this information . . . into consideration when determining 
whether to make such health plan available through the Exchange.”). 
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2.  Public or Private Forms 
Second, the law requires each state to create an exchange as ei-
ther a “governmental agency or nonprofit entity . . . established by a 
State,”147 meaning that a state that does not utilize the federally run 
exchange must house an exchange within the government or create 
a new nonprofit.148  Indeed some states have utilized one or the oth-
er of these forms in order to reach a decision as to the form of the 
permanent structure.149 
Efficiency considerations150 may be in tension with other concerns.  
A publicly run exchange would be directly linked with the state’s ad-
ministration, facilitating communication with related government bo-
dies (including the state Medicaid office, insurance department, and 
consumer protection agency).151  State-operated exchanges will also 
likely offer greater transparency, a factor that California considered in 
deciding to create an independent government entity.152  However, 
despite ease of communications with related entities, state bureaucra-
cy and political considerations may slow or complicate decisionmak-
ing, hiring, and contracting.153  Creating an independent or quasi-
governmental public agency—or a nonprofit organization—could al-
alleviate some of these concerns by uncoupling these functions from 
politicians but would reduce the efficiencies gained by having direct 
contact with state agencies.154 
 
147 Id. § 1311, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(d)(1). 
148 Because state exchanges are required to be self-sustaining by 2015, states are 
expected to prioritize issues of efficiency.  Id., 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(d)(5). 
149 For example, Iowa created the Iowa Legislative Health Care Coverage Commis-
sion in 2009 to determine, among other things, where to house an exchange that shall 
be operational by July 1, 2011.  Act of May 19, 2009, ch. 118, § 1.1.a(f), 2009 Iowa Acts 
391, 392.  Colorado has instead charged its Division of Insurance with identifying the 
necessary changes to Colorado law that PPACA will require.  See LOREZ MEINHOLD, OF-
FICE OF THE GOVERNOR, IMPLEMENTING HEALTH CARE REFORM:  A ROADMAP FOR COL-
ORADO 13 (2010) (noting that the Colorado Division of Finance is inventorying PPACA 
and state insurance law).  
150 See PPACA § 1311, 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(5) (imposing limitations on allocation 
of funds, including restrictions on wasteful expenditures). 
151 See, e.g., AMERICAN HEALTH BENEFIT EXCHANGE MODEL ACT, § 4(A) drafting 
note (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, Draft 2010) (addressing benefits of locating insur-
ance exchanges in a state agency as opposed to other models).   
152 See CAL. HEALTH CARE FOUND., supra note 141, at 9 (“[California] decided on a 
government option principally because government ‘has to conduct its business in the 
public.’” (quoting Jennifer Kent, Deputy Sec’y for Legislation, Office of the Governor)).   
153 Cf. id. (discussing the need to make the exchange’s structure “nimble”). 
154 See FAMILIES USA, IMPLEMENTING HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES:  OPTIONS FOR 
GOVERNANCE AND OVERSIGHT 5-6 (2011), available at http://familiesusa2.org/assets/ 
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Additionally, state-run exchanges may pose bigger conflict-of-
interest problems.155  For example, Connecticut recently created Susti-
Net, a state-run health plan that will be offered on Connecticut’s ex-
change if it is certified as a qualified plan.156  SustiNet’s Board of 
Directors has noted that governance of the state-run plan and the ex-
change must be entirely distinct to avoid a conflict of interest and has 
recommended that Connecticut either opt into the federal exchange 
or place SustiNet in the hands of a quasi-governmental agency that is 
removed from the state government.157 
Finally, choosing between state and privately run exchanges will 
implicate basic capacity concerns.  The selected body must have the 
facility to govern the exchange, including performing the minimum 
set of regulatory functions PPACA sets forth (e.g., certifying plans to 
participate, making limited-eligibility determinations, and monitoring 
benefits and plan offerings) along with any additional requirements 
state law imposes.  States opting to place the exchange within the state 
government will likely create new entities, as extant bodies are ill-
suited to perform governance functions,158 although some states may 
opt to place an exchange within the state governor’s office, as Utah 
did.159  Other states—such as Massachusetts, California, and Connecti-
cut—have or are planning to create a new state agency, and will appoint 
a small governing board (e.g., five to ten people) that includes individ-
uals representing the expertise the exchanges will demand (such as 
 
pdfs/health-reform/Exchanges-Governance-and-Oversight.pdf (discussing the advantag-
es and disadvantages of state “quasi-governmental” agencies to hosting the exchanges). 
155 See Jon Kingsdale & John Bertko, Insurance Exchanges Under Health Reform:  Six 
Design Issues for the States, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1158, 1159 (2010) (raising concerns about 
unfair discrimination among carriers).   
156 SustiNet coverage is available immediately to Medicaid and HUSKY beneficia-
ries and state employees or retirees, and to small or not-for-profit businesses and muni-
cipalities as of July 1, 2012.  NANCY WYMAN & KEVIN LEMBO, SUSTINET HEALTH P’SHIP 
BD. OF DIRS., IMPLEMENTING SUSTINET FOLLOWING FEDERAL ENACTMENT OF THE PA-
TIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT OF 2010:  A PRELIMINARY REPORT TO 
THE CONNECTICUT GENERAL ASSEMBLY 1 (2010).   
157 Id.   
158 See JOST, supra note 97, at 2-6 (noting that Medicaid agencies may be incompe-
tent to perform exchange regulatory functions, but that consumer protection agencies 
in some states may be appropriate bodies for the exchanges); see also CAREY, supra note 
127, at 6 (noting that “natural homes” for an exchange may be found in state insur-
ance departments, Medicaid agencies, and administrators of state employee health 
benefits, but that all three lack specialized expertise in administering an exchange). 
159 Utah housed its exchange within the Governor’s Office of Economic Develop-
ment, under a new branch entitled the Office of Consumer Health Services.  UTAH 
CODE ANN. 63M-1-2504 (LexisNexis Supp. 2010). 
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economists, actuaries, plan benefit specialists, and health policy ex-
perts) along with representatives from interested parties (such as busi-
nesses, insurers, health care providers, and consumers).160  In addition, 
states must exercise caution to avoid creating conflicts of interest.161  
Even if a new entity is created to govern an exchange, close interaction 
with related state agencies will be critical.  For example, a governor’s of-
fice will likely play a central role in appointing some or all of the board 
members.162  Although exchanges will not be required to conduct eligi-
bility determinations with respect to tax subsidies or exemptions,163 they 
will need close contact with state Medicaid and insurance agencies to 
facilitate proper referrals of those eligible for public coverage. 
3.  Information Requirements and Consumer Participation 
Two key goals of PPACA’s exchanges are to create greater infor-
mation disclosure and to foster public participation in the health in-
surance sector.  The exchanges expand consumer access to plan in-
 
160 For example, Connecticut’s Health Care Reform Advisory Board has recom-
mended that the state create a board chaired by the Secretary of the Office of Policy 
and Management.  The board’s composition should include an actuary, a plan benefit 
specialist, a health care economist, the Commissioners of Social Services, Public Hea-
lth, and Insurance, and the State Comptroller, as well as representatives from small 
and large businesses, insurers, providers, and consumers.  CONN. HEALTH CARE REF-
ORM ADVISORY BD., FINAL REPORT TO GOVERNOR RELL AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 10 
(2010).  Massachusetts’s Connector is governed by a board composed of four public 
officers as well as six appointed members (three appointed by the office of the attorney 
general and three by the governor’s office).  MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 176Q, § 2 (Lexis-
Nexis Supp. 2010).  The board governing California’s exchange will include two mem-
bers appointed by the governor, one each appointed by the state senate and house, 
and one appointed by the Secretary of Health and Human Services.  Act of Sept. 30, 
2010, ch. 659, sec. 2, § 10500(a) 2010 Cal. Stat. 3598, 3599 (to be codified at CAL. 
GOV’T CODE § 10500).  For a discussion of the structure of governing boards of ex-
changes, see JOST, supra note 97, at 6-7.  
161 States will likely have to prohibit representatives from the health care and in-
surance industries from board participation.  For example, California’s law prohibits a 
board member from seeking employment with an insurer, agent, broker, or health 
care provider within one year of service, and bars any compensation during service.  
Sec. 2, § 10500(f)(2), 2010 Cal. Stat. at 3599.  For a more in-depth discussion, see JOST, 
supra note 97, at 6-7 (discussing how to structure agency boards in order to prevent 
conflicts of interest). 
162 See JOST, supra note 97, at 7 (noting that the most common state board struc-
ture will require the governor’s office to appoint board members subject to approval 
by the legislature). 
163 PPACA requires the Treasury to make subsidy payments directly to plans, 
meaning that a state exchange may decline any involvement in the eligibility process.  
Cf. CAL. HEALTH CARE FOUND., supra note 141, at 5 (noting that this provision is dif-
ferent from the payment structure in Massachusetts).   
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formation and create avenues for public involvement in the decision-
making process.  The specific aims are to facilitate easy plan compari-
son, to maximize transparency, and to boost competition.  Moreover, 
this “two-way street” will cultivate consumer participation in the struc-
turing of exchanges and regulations, thereby augmenting public ac-
ceptance of a changing health care market. 
a.  Providing Consumer Information 
PPACA requires exchanges to facilitate easy comparisons of plan 
benefits, costs, and policies, seeking to maximize competition among 
participating plans.  More specifically, the law requires states to pro-
vide, at a minimum, plain language summary information and quality 
ratings.164  PPACA also requires states to engage hard-to-reach popula-
tions.165  For assistance in providing this information, states may apply 
for grants to expand or create offices of health insurance consumer 
assistance or ombudsman programs.166 
The plain language summaries of plan benefits,167 as well as quality 
ratings,168 will supplement information already available on a federally 
created website providing plan information.169  This information must 
incorporate data on provider accessibility, cost sharing, health out-
comes, readmission rates, safety and error reduction programs, medi-
cal-loss ratios, claims payment and denial policies, enrollment pat-
terns, and wellness plans,170 and be available via website as well as 
 
164 PPACA § 10104(f)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(e)(3)(B) (West Supp. 1B 2010). 
165 Id. § 1311, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(d)(6)(e). 
166 Id. sec. 1002, § 2793, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-93 (West Supp. 1A 2010).  In 2011, 
twenty-nine million dollars of grant money is available for the development or expan-
sion of consumer assistance programs.  Grants will be awarded by the Department of 
Health and Human Services’s Office of Consumer Information and Insurance Over-
sight (OCIIO).  OFFICE OF CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., CFDA NO. 93,519, AFFORDABLE CARE ACT—CONSUMER ASSISTANCE 
PROGRAM GRANTS INITIAL ANNOUNCEMENT:  INVITATION TO APPLY FOR FY 2010, at 4 
(2010).  
167 PPACA § 10104(f)(2) (West Supp. 1B 2010).  The format for plan summaries will 
be designed by the Secretary based on input from the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners.  Id. § 1311, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(c)(1)(F). 
168 Ratings must be available for each tier of coverage, based on the relative quality 
and price of each participating plan, as well as beneficiary satisfaction scores for plans 
serving over 500 individuals.  Id. § 1311, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(c)(3)–(4). 
169 PPACA requires the Department of Health and Human Services to create a 
website helping consumers to identify coverage options by July 1, 2010.  Id. § 1103, 42 
U.S.C.A. § 18003. 
170 See, e.g., id. § 1001, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-17 (West Supp. 1A 2010) (requiring 
health insurance providers to cover wellness programs).  Additionally, plans participat-
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through a toll-free hotline.171  States will have to determine whether to 
make summary information binding on insurers, which may prevent 
plans from attracting consumers based on misrepresentations.172  Al-
though not required, additional user-friendly features will likely fur-
ther stimulate increased competition.  For example, the Massachusetts 
Connector provides consumers with a side-by-side comparison of plans 
at a given coverage level based on the user’s age, household size, and 
zip code.173  California’s law authorizes the exchange board to require 
each participating plan to make an electronic directory of network 
providers available to users.174 
In addition to providing easily accessible information, PPACA re-
quires states to take steps to reach out to those least likely to use the 
exchange.  While employed individuals will receive notice of an avail-
able exchange from an employer,175 the state must target hard-to-reach 
individuals in need of coverage, thereby increasing the efficacy of the 
mandate.  PPACA also requires states to award grants to entities serv-
ing as “navigators.”176  These entities must perform outreach services, 
including public education campaigns, distribution of information, 
and referrals to consumer assistance offices.177  Some states have al-
ready created navigator-type entities for public coverage options but 
 
ing on the exchanges must report data on in- and out-of-network provider availability 
and cost sharing to the Department of Health and Human Services.  See id. § 1311, 42 
U.S.C.A. § 18003(c)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1B 2010) (detailing requirements for plan cer-
tification); id. § 1311, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18003(e)(2)–(3) (explaining that an exchange 
may certify a health plan if it meets certification guidelines).  For a discussion of re-
porting requirements, see JOST, supra note 97, at 31-32.   
171 PPACA § 1311, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(d)(4).   
172 While PPACA requires that a plan summary must “accurately describe” the 
benefits and coverage a plan provides “so that consumers may compare health insur-
ance coverage and understand the terms of coverage (or exception to such coverage),” 
it also requires that the summary direct the consumer to the plan itself to determine 
contractual details.  Id. sec. 1001, §§ 2715(a), (b)(3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-15 (West 
Supp. 1A 2010); see also JOST, supra note 97, at 32-34 (discussing the “accurately de-
scribe” requirement and arguing that these descriptions should be legally binding). 
173 See Health Connector, MASSGOV.COM, https://www.mahealthconnector.org/ 
portal/site/connector (last visited Mar. 15, 2011).  
174 California Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, ch. 655, sec. 8, 
§ 100504(a)(9), 2010 Cal. Stat. 3553, 3563 (to be codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100504).  
175 PPACA requires employers to provide written notice to employees regarding 
the existence of an exchange and an employee’s potential eligibility for a premium 
assistance tax credit and/or cost sharing reduction, as well as the potential loss of em-
ployer contribution to an employer-sponsored plan if the employee purchases cover-
age through the exchange.  PPACA sec. 1512, § 18B, 29 U.S.C.A. § 218B. 
176 Id. § 1311, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(i) (West Supp. 1B 2010). 
177 Id. 
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will have to create additional programs to target individuals likely to 
purchase coverage on the exchange.  For example, in New York, 
community-based organizations, consumer assistance programs, and 
facilitated enrollers conduct outreach to assist low-income individuals 
in accessing public coverage; New York will have to create navigators 
to provide information regarding the new exchanges as well.178 
b.  Seeking Consumer Input 
The inclusion of public participation in the implementation and 
functioning of the exchanges will be another component of establish-
ing effective exchanges that are responsive to consumer needs.179  Cit-
izen input will create a two-way flow of plan information, potentially 
facilitating a dialogue about the efficacy of this revised health care 
market.  PPACA requires that states engage consumers during im-
plementation of the exchanges and that they seek continued input 
regarding plan quality. 
To do this, PPACA mandates that states consult with diverse 
stakeholders in establishing exchanges, including health care con-
sumers enrolled in qualified plans.180  Colorado has taken the lead in 
engaging the public, holding weekly “office hours” with the director 
of health-reform implementation and organizing 150 outreach activi-
ties—including forums, conferences, and press conferences—since 
April 2010.181  Other states have focused their efforts to engage stake-
holders on soliciting the opinions of varying interest groups by creat-
ing diverse advisory boards, rather than opening the floor to the 
greater public.182  Whether the latter approach will constitute ade-
quate “stakeholder involvement” remains to be seen—to date, interim 
guidance issued by the Office of Consumer Information and Insur-
ance Oversight (OCIIO) has been limited.  OCIIO’s “Initial Guidance 
 
178 See N.Y. STATE HEALTH FOUND., IMPLEMENTING FEDERAL HEALTH CARE 
REFORM:  A ROADMAP FOR NEW YORK STATE 32 (2010) (describing the duties of naviga-
tors and qualifications for eligibility to serve as a navigator in the state).  
179 Including greater public participation in health plans themselves is also a com-
ponent of PPACA.  The law includes funding for the establishment of the Consumer 
Operated and Oriented Plan (“CO-OP”) program, which will both increase competi-
tion and provide new consumer-directed options to the health insurance market.  
PPACA § 1322, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18042.  
180 Id. § 1311, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(d)(6). 
181 See MEINHOLD, supra note 149, at 26 (describing Colorado’s outreach activities).  
182 See Getting Organized—How States Are Preparing to Implement National Health 
Reform, STATES IN ACTION (The Commonwealth Fund, New York, N.Y.), July–Aug. 
2010, at 10-12 (describing outreach efforts in Pennsylvania and Virginia). 
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to States on Exchanges” mentions the importance of public involve-
ment in setting up the exchanges, stating that “[s]uccessful exchanges 
will work closely with consumer advocates,” among other stakehold-
ers.183  Further regulatory guidance on the types of stakeholders to in-
volve, the degree of involvement, or the responsiveness of the ex-
change to public comment has not been provided.  Nonetheless, 
incorporating consumer input may prove beneficial even if not a regu-
latory obligation.  Indeed, even without this mandate, public input 
may prove to be a necessary element of meeting the duty to ensure 
that certified plans are “in the interests of qualified individuals and 
qualified employers.”184 
In addition to their role in giving input on the establishment of 
the exchanges themselves, citizens will also provide feedback on the 
health insurance plans offered through the exchanges.  Section 
1311(c) of PPACA is the primary vehicle for the transmission of in-
formation about health insurance plans offered through the ex-
changes.  As discussed above, plan ratings will be based in part on an 
“enrollee satisfaction survey system” that § 1311(c)(4) requires the 
Secretary to establish.185  This survey system, modeled after the system 
in place for the Federal Employee Health Benefit Program,186 and, 
similar to consumer review tools that have become ubiquitous in on-
line markets for other products,187 provides an opportunity for con-
sumers to comment on their satisfaction with their health plans.  
These reviews will help structure the landscape of plans that are of-
fered through the exchanges.  The enrollee-satisfaction component is 
intended to “make the proposed health care exchange easier to navi-
gate while also providing consumers an effective way to hold their in-
surance company accountable.”188 
 
183 OFFICE OF CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, supra note 126. 
184 PPACA § 1311, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(e)(1).  
185 Id. § 1311, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(c)(4). 
186 Press Release, Sen. Mark Pryor, Pryor Adds Consumer-Friendly Tool to Simplify 
Health Care Choices, Hold Insurance Companies Accountable (Dec. 7, 2009), available 
at http://pryor.senate.gov/newsroom/details.cfm?id=320497&. 
187 See Ezra Klein, Mark Pryor Makes the Health Insurance Exchanges a Bit More Like Ama-
zon.com, WASH. POST BLOG (Dec. 7, 2009, 4:37 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ 
ezra-klein/2009/12/mark_pryor_makes_the_health_in.html (comparing the survey sys-
tem to consumer reviews prevalent on online shopping sites like Amazon.com).  
188 Press Release, supra note 186.  
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4.  Summary 
The characteristics described in this Part create only the potential 
for meaningful citizen engagement. System design will be critical in 
determining whether the capacity for effective citizenship practices 
is actually enhanced under PPACA.189  Its construction as a private 
market-based social insurance system with multiple risk pools, for ex-
ample, positions it differently than Social Security.  Campbell found 
that the uniformity of rules in Social Security signals that each per-
son’s participation is equally legitimate, which in turn produces more 
such activity.190  PPACA is neither entirely uniform the way Social Se-
curity is nor is it a fully means-tested program like Medicaid.191 
There is ample authority in PPACA for policymaking that would 
enhance participatory governance, especially at the exchange level.  Just 
as the impact of Social Security was unknown at the time of its enact-
ment, the full potential for development of citizenship practices under 
PPACA is currently unknown. Much will depend on state-level initiatives 
and whether federal officials permit or facilitate such initiatives. 
C.  Social Meanings of PPACA 
Although one cannot be sure today of how significant the oppor-
tunities for the exercise of participation rights may become under 
PPACA, the essential functions and components of social insurance 
systems—which mimic citizenship norms—exist in PPACA’s structure. 
First, PPACA creates a system of multiple mutual benefits among 
individual participants.  The benefits to each person are unpredicta-
ble and contingent:  Person A may reap only modest value from years 
of investment through the payment of premiums, but she is virtually 
certain to realize some significant benefits over time.  In such a sys-
tem, formal constraints are necessary to prevent free-rider problems.  
Other mutual financial benefits include protection against wasteful 
use of public funds to compensate providers for treatments furnished 
 
189 See CAMPBELL, supra note 73 at 125-37 (describing survey results finding that par-
ticipation rates differed across different benefit programs); COHEN, supra note 48, at 
23-37, 66-69, 345-357 (describing the impact that consumers can have and the participa-
tion and citizen activity of consumer movements throughout the twentieth century). 
190 CAMPBELL, supra note 73, at 138. 
191 Campbell attributes lower levels of political engagement by participants in 
means-tested programs in part to the contrast between a professionalized Social Security 
bureaucracy that applies clear standards to an entire population and programs for the 
needy characterized by stigma, red tape, and complex eligibility criteria.  Id. at 129-32. 
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to the uninsured and the reduction of transaction costs in providing 
all medical treatments. 
There is also mutual benefit in the spillover of positive externali-
ties that accrue to population health and thus to participants collec-
tively.  Public health studies have shown that insurance status is posi-
tively correlated with improved health outcomes for individuals.192 
Economic analyses suggest that increasing health insurance coverage 
in the United States would result in large national-level socio-
economic gains.193  In addition, recent outbreaks of infectious diseas-
es, often on a global scale, indicate that removing barriers to treat-
ment for those exposed to such diseases is an important aspect of the 
defense of a community.194 
Second, PPACA creates reciprocal obligations.  The system’s pro-
vision of health insurance will provide protection to the individual 
against possibly devastating financial risk in exchange for the relative-
ly minor obligation to purchase it.  Government is in effect insuring 
the insurers.  On a more philosophical level, the new law will streng-
then social norms of solidarity and responsibility and extend a deeper 
consciousness of these norms to public discourse related to the 
health care system. 
In sum, PPACA extends the functional aspects of citizenship to 
the American health care system for the first time.  Rather than priva-
tizing health care, as has recently occurred in nations that adopted a 
much more public system after World War II, the United States has 
approached a social insurance system from essentially the opposite di-
rection.  PPACA retains a private system of market exchange, but 
“publicizes” it by importing a limited, but significant, set of public-
sector characteristics. 
What remains missing is a coherent, broadly shared public narra-
tive about the meaning of PPACA.  The frustration and delay of that 
component of the law’s potential has been the primary achievement 
 
192 See, e.g., Peter Franks et al., Health Insurance and Mortality: Evidence from a Na-
tional Cohort, 270 JAMA 737, 740 (1993) (finding that insurance has a similar effect on 
mortality as socioeconomic status, education, and self-rated health).   
193 See James A. Thorton & Jennifer L. Rice, Does Extending Health Insurance Coverage 
to the Uninsured Improve Population Health Outcomes?, 6 APPLIED HEALTH ECON. & 
HEALTH POL’Y 217, 228 (2008) (“[T]here may be large social economic benefits and 
net benefits from extending health insurance coverage to the uninsured.”). 
194 See, e.g., Matthew K. Wynia & Lawrence Gostin, The Bioterrorist Threat and Access 
to Health Care, 296 SCIENCE 1613, 1613 (2002) (noting that uninsured Americans who 
could not access evaluation and care for infectious disease pose a national security 
threat in the event of a bioterrorism attack). 
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so far of the campaign of constitutional challenges against it.  Assum-
ing that the Supreme Court eventually upholds PPACA, the opening 
of the exchanges in 2014 may create a fresh opportunity for social-
meaning entrepreneurs to create the foundations for health care sys-
tem citizenship practices. 
CONCLUSION 
Governance processes—and not simply the rules that establish 
program content and eligibility—have a profound effect on whether 
the broader impact of a reform will be expressive of democratic val-
ues.  A social welfare reform of the magnitude of PPACA will almost 
certainly generate new citizenship practices vis-à-vis the health system, 
although the direction of that change is not yet clear.  The two most 
important aspects of new citizenship practices that could develop un-
der PPACA are its potential, over time, to instantiate a new reciprocal 
covenant of mutual security, and its potential to enhance participatory 
self-governance. 
It will be years before we know whether the new health reform law 
will alter the social meaning of membership in the American commu-
nity, and if so, how.  PPACA represents the first attempt in U.S. history 
to provide (almost) universal health insurance, yet it does so in a way 
that preserves a fragmented market and perpetuates structural in-
equalities in access to coverage.  As this Article goes to press, there is 
no assurance that the new law—and especially the individual 
mandate—will even survive judicial scrutiny.195 
Lacking a crystal ball and in recognition of two earlier, bitterly 
fought efforts to secure new public goods, let me close by borrowing 
from both Benjamin Franklin196 and the health reform proposal ad-
vanced by President Clinton197:  What have we created by enacting 
PPACA?  It’s a health security system, if you can keep it. 
 
 
195 See supra note 98 (citing cases challenging PPACA). 
196 Franklin engaged in the following exchange after the conclusion of the Consti-
tutional Convention:  “‘Well, Doctor, what have we got—a Republic or a Monarchy?’  
‘A Republic, if you can keep it.’”  RESPECTFULLY QUOTED:  A DICTIONARY OF QUOTA-
TIONS FROM THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 299 (Suzy Platt ed., 1992). 
197 See American Health Security Act of 1993, H.R. 1200, 103d Cong. § 101 (1993) 
(“establish[ing] . . . a State-Based American Health Security Program” (emphasis added)). 
